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“External Stakeholder Benevolence”
An Emerging Policy Paradigm in International Criminal 
Justice?— Critical Reflections on the Paris Declaration 2017 
and the Oslo Recommendations 2018 on the Efficiency and 
Legitimacy of International Courts
BY MICHAEL BOHLANDER*
Abstract
The debate about concerns surrounding the efficiency and legitimacy of international (crim-
inal) courts has been joined by a new voice, judicial declarations on how proceedings can 
be expedited and the legitimacy deficit resolved, in particular the Paris Declaration of 2017 
and the Oslo Recommendations of 2018, which deal with “enhancing their institutions’ 
legitimacy in the eyes of diverse stakeholders.” This article queries in detail whether either 
document manages to do that, as well as the emerging lens of “external stakeholder benev-
olence.” It argues that a traditional stakeholder theory approach must break down when 
the decision about the interest (fair trial) against which other stakeholders’ interests are 
to be balanced has been assigned exclusively to one stakeholder (judges), barring other 
stakeholders from encroaching on that stakeholder’s position (judicial independence). The 
 * Formerly International (Reserve) Co- Investigating Judge, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia (2015– 2019); Judge, Kosovo Specialist Chambers (2017– present); Chair in Comparative and 
International Criminal Law, Durham Law School (UK). The views expressed are solely those of the author 
writing in a purely personal capacity. All websites were last accessed on 30 January 2019.— I would like to 
thank Professor Caroline Fournet (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen), Justice Adel Maged (Court of Cassation, 
Cairo); Professor Anja Matwijkiw (Indiana University Northwest); Professor Dawn Rothe (Eastern 
Kentucky University); Dr Fritz Wefelmeyer (Durham) and a judicial colleague who wished to remain anon-
ymous for their helpful comments on an earlier draft. The usual disclaimer applies.
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judicial perspective on stakeholder- theory- based attempts at defining the parameters of the 
judicial core environment will thus always be one of intrusion.
Finally, I note that the Prosecution references the Court’s finite financial, human, and 
temporal resources to plead in favour of judicial efficiency. However, I deem necessary 
to reassert that the Court’s paramount consideration should always be the interest of 
justice first, after which other factors may be considered. Expedience cannot come at 
the cost of full, robust, and in- depth contemplation of the complex issue of jurisdiction.”
Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Marc Perrin de Brichambaut to the ICC’s Pre- 
Trial Chamber’s Decision on the “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction 
under Article 19(3) of the Statute1
1. “A SPECTRE IS HAUNTING  
THE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIARY . . . ”
It seems international judges are on the run— on the run from the political fallout from the 
allegedly less than efficient handling of international cases over the years, especially in the 
criminal justice environment since the establishment of the first ad- hoc criminal tribunals, 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993 and of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994. The current debate in practice 
centres to a large extent on criminal proceedings, where concerns surrounding efficiency 
arise directly from principles such as the right to a speedy and fair trial. In recent years, the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), for example, has come under heavy criticism2 for the 
record of cases tried and adjudicated since 2002, the year it became operational.3 The cost- 
benefit analysis appeared slim to many observers and, more to the point, the donors. The 
uncomfortable question of whether the massive expense poured into international (crim-
inal) justice was still justifiable reared its head— increasingly so after the recent resurgence 
of populism and national exceptionalism around the world. The ICC judges, not least at 
the repeated requests by the Assembly of States Parties (ASP),4 began to investigate the 
 1 Case No. ICC- RoC46(3)- 01/ 18- 37- Anx- ENG at para. 42, online at https://www.icc- cpi.int/ 
RelatedRecords/ CR2018_ 04205.PDF. Judge de Brichambaut is a signatory to both the Paris Declaration 
2017 and the Oslo Recommendations 2018.
 2 It now seems that there is even criticism of its— and other tribunals’— manner of determining what are “general 
principles of law” under Art. 38 ICJ Statute, with Chigara floating the idea of an observatory for monitoring 
compliance to enhance consistency. See Benedict A. Chigara, Towards a nemo judex in parte sua Critique of 
the International Criminal Court?, ICLR (2018), advance article DOI 10.1163/ 15718123- 01806004, 1.
 3 See only Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, The ICC: High Expectations, ambiguous record, 2013, online at 
https://www.css.ethz.ch/ publications/ pdfs/ CSS- Analysis- 130- EN.pdf; Fergal Gaynor & Christopher Hale, 
Rome Statute at 20: Suggestions to States to Strengthen the ICC, EJIL: Talk!, 6 August 2018, online at https://
www.ejiltalk.org/ rome- statute- at- 20- suggestions- to- states- to- strengthen- the- icc/ ; Jessica Hatcher- Moore, 
Is the world’s highest court fit for purpose?, The Guardian, 5 April 2017, online at https://www.theguardian.
com/ global- development- professionals- network/ 2017/ apr/ 05/ international- criminal- court- fit- purpose.
 4 See the descriptions by Renan Villacis, Working Methods of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute, 
International Criminal Law Review 563 (2018); Osvaldo Zavala, The Budgetary Efficiency of the 
International Criminal Court, International Criminal Law Review 461 (2018); Hannah Woolaver & 
Emma Palmer, Challenges to the Independence of the International Criminal Court from the Assembly of States 
Parties, Journal of International Criminal Justice 641 (2017).
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causes for the delays and lack of efficiency, publishing regular updates on the progress to 
a better degree of streamlining its procedures, culminating in the partial consensus on cer-
tain matters which had beset the ICC’s practice in the early years in the Chambers Practice 
Manual.5 Similar things are happening at other courts:  The Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), for example, have published quarterly updates of their 
“completion plan” since 2014,6 in order to provide (a semblance of?) accountability to the 
donors and the public. The literature related to judicial key performance indicators and 
ways of increasing efficiency is mushrooming.7
A new voice in the debate around of efficiency and budget- saving with a particular focus 
on international courts8 has now appeared— the judicial declaration, or recommendation, 
on how proceedings can be expedited and the alleged legitimacy deficit resolved, i.e. in 
particular the Paris Declaration of 20179 (hereinafter PD) and the Oslo Recommendations 
of 201810 (hereinafter OR). These documents, which despite a clear thematic overlap 
make no explicit reference to prior and in part more extensive policy statements such 
as, for example, the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct and the Measures for [their] 
Effective Implementation,11 were drafted by judges from various international(ised) courts 
and tribunals, not only criminal ones, and ostensibly in their personal capacity; they are 
not binding instruments passed or even endorsed officially by the respective courts where 
those judges serve.
 5 Online at https://www.legal- tools.org/ doc/ f0ee26/ , see also the first- hand account by former ICC judge 
and President Silvia F. de Gurmendi, Enhancing the Court’s Efficiency, JICJ 341(2018), and Yvonne Mc 
Dermott, The International Criminal Court’s Chambers Practice Manual, Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 873 (2017).
 6 The completion plan updates since 2014 are available at https:// www.eccc.gov.kh/ en/ about- eccc/ 
finances under “Other Documents.”
 7 See the EU Justice Score Board, COM (2018) 364 final; Bencze, Mátyás/ Ng, Gar Yein (eds.), How to 
Measure the Quality of Judicial Reasoning, Ius Gentium:  Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol. 
69, 2018, as well as the contributions to the symposium volume in the International Criminal Law 
Review 2018:  Hirad Abtahi & Rebecca Young, Introduction. The Rome Statute at Twenty:  Enhancing 
Efficiency and Effectiveness at the International Criminal Court, International Criminal Law Review, 
377 (2018); Hirad Abtahi & Shehzad Charania, Expediting the ICC Criminal Process:  Striking the Right 
Balance between the ICC and States Parties, ibid., 383; Philipp Ambach, Performance Indicators for 
International(ised) Criminal Courts— Potential for Increase of an Institution’s Legacy or ‘Just’ a Means of 
Budgetary Control?, ibid., 426; Osvaldo Zavala, The Budgetary Efficiency of the International Criminal Court, 
ibid., 461; Sam Sasan Shoamanesh, Institution Building: Perspective from within the Office of the Prosecutor of 
the International Criminal Court, ibid., 489; William St- Michel, Chloé Grandon & Marlene Yahya Haage, 
Strengthening the Role of Defence at the International Criminal Court: Reflections on How Defence Is and Can 
Be Supported for Greater Effectiveness and Efficiencies, ibid., 517; Mikel Delagrange, The Path towards Greater 
Efficiency and Effectiveness in the Victim Application Processes of the International Criminal Court, ibid., 540.
 8 But see also the 2018 Doha Declaration on Judicial Integrity, which dealt with national judiciaries but had 
also one ICC judge, Sanji Mmasenono Monageng, formerly First Vice- President of the ICC from 2012 to 
2015, attending; online at https://www.unodc.org/ ji/ en/ restricted/ network- launch.html.
 9 See download facilities for both French and English versions at https:// ihej.org/ programmes/ justice- 
penale- internationale/ une- justice- penale- internationale- plus- efficace- la- declaration- de- paris- du- 16- 
octobre- 2017/ .
 10 Link to pdf at https://www.brandeis.edu/ ethics/ internationaljustice/ biij/ 2018.html.
 11 See the related documentation online at https:// www.judicialintegritygroup.org/ jig- downloads/ jig-  
documents.
24 “ E x T E R N A L  S T A k E H O L D E R  B E N E v O L E N C E ”
24
 • Therein lies the first problem— for whom and with what authority do these judges 
speak publicly on matters of principle and policy, and why should other judges care 
about their declarations?
 • The second problem relates to the substantive advancement of the matter at hand, 
especially if compared to documents such as the Bangalore Principles, and of the reas-
surance for the donors that these declarations actually produce, which in my view is 
minimal at best, not least due to a high degree of vagueness in many of the individual 
recommendations. Moreover, what are the consequences in particular proceedings 
of the violation of the recommendations so announced— if there are not meant to be 
any, what is the purpose of making them?
 • Thirdly, the biggest concern of all, however, is an emerging new and ultimately neo- 
liberal and managerial judicial mindset that appears to lurk behind the phrases used 
in the PD and OR, and its implications for judicial independence.
I will dissect these issues below with detailed reference to the two documents, focussing in 
my argument mostly on criminal proceedings, where efficiency concerns are most pressing 
for obvious reasons. However, two points need to be made before we embark upon that 
study. Firstly, as I have stated elsewhere before,12 the concern13 about efficiency in the hand-
ling of proceedings is real, even though things have improved since the early days of the 
ICTY and ICTR. However, comparisons to drives at efficiency in national courts, which 
are sometimes adduced,14 are of limited usefulness. Domestic criminal courts
 • operate in a much more smoothly organised and contained system,
 • are regulated to a much higher degree through detailed codes of procedure,
 • benefit from the knowledge of a long- established, regular and relatively speedy judi-
cial appellate culture, even down to idiosyncrasies in specific court districts, which 
aids in keeping the application of the law in practice as uniform as possible,
 • are populated by lawyers, prosecutors and judges who have all undergone the same 
legal training, a lot of whom tend to have the majority of their practice in a finite 
number of courts within their district and can thus build up grounded knowledge on 
individual judicial practices and mutual professional trust, which will often allow for 
a more pragmatic approach to procedural issues,
 • enjoy much higher synergy effects because of the courts’ well- oiled administrative 
support sections and the fact that the vast majority of cases in a domestic jurisdiction 
will tend to be run- of- the- mill which seasoned judges can much more easily dispose 
of, with complex cases being a minority,
 • are partially cross- financed from court fees and expenses paid by parties, for example, 
in civil proceedings, or from cost orders against convicted defendants, as well as from 
fines, which usually go to the general fiscal budget.
 12 Paradise Postponed?— For a judge- led generic model of international criminal procedure and an end to “draft- as- 
you- go”, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 45, 331 (2014).
 13 A detailed account of the first years of the ICC and the diverging practices is given by de Gurmendi, supra 
note 5.
 14 Philipp Ambach, Performance Indicators for International(ised) Criminal Courts— Potential for Increase of an 
Institution’s Legacy or ‘Just’ a Means of Budgetary Control?, International Criminal Law Review, 426 
(2018).
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None of the above apply, even over 25 years after the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR, 
to the same degree to international criminal courts:
 • In particular, there is no self- or cross- financing aspect to their operation, because 
the convicted persons are not as a rule ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings— 
regardless of whether they may have the means to do so— and no- one pays any fees 
or costs for any part of the proceedings,
 • any payments by the convicted person are primarily meant to be channelled to the 
victims as reparations in the wider sense, not to the courts’ budgets,
 • financing international courts in effect occurs thus almost entirely à fonds perdu,
 • their cases are almost all in the category of complex litigation, probably even if the 
case proceeds on the basis of a guilty plea or confession,
 • there is a myriad of procedural protagonists from diverse legal backgrounds without 
a common understanding of legal principles, rules of interpretation etc.,
 • who have not built up a joint local practice— at best they will have come across each 
other in multiple international courts,
 • some of the judges (still) come with, some without practical courtroom experience,
 • procedural frameworks before international(ized) courts tend to differ as well, es-
pecially if a court is embedded in a national system, yet there is a constant stream of 
allegedly cross- fertilising citations from other international(ized) courts.
Secondly, on a note of full disclosure, I  was the international (reserve) co- investigating 
judge at the ECCC from June 2015 to July 2019 and have myself, together with my then 
Cambodian colleague, been accused of causing undue delay15 in the investigation of Case 
004/ 1 by the ECCC’s Pre- Trial Chamber; I am still on the roster of judges of the Kosovo 
Specialist Chambers (KSC). Neither can I, nor do I intend to, speak for either court or any 
of my judicial colleagues, domestic or international. Yet, it is legitimate for me to publicly 
express my own personal disagreement with other judges on matters of policy and principle 
as opposed to individual cases, if they themselves, some as sitting judges of the same courts 
I am/ was a member of, chose to engage publicly in such sensitive and ultimately political 
announcements in their personal capacity. I  am in any event already on public official 
record regarding my critical views on the topic of efficiency vs. fair trial through the ECCC 
co- investigating judges’ budget impact decision of 11 August 2017.16
 15 See ECCC Pre- Trial Chamber, Case 004/ 1 against Im Chaem, Doc. No. D308/ 3/ 1/ 20, Considerations on 
the International Co- Prosecutor’s Appeal of Closing Order (Reasons), 29 June 2018, online at https://
www.eccc.gov.kh/ en/ document/ court/ considerations- international- co- prosecutors- appeal- closing- 
order- reasons— Judicial ethics and decorum prevent me from discussing the merits of that charge here. 
My arguments in the context of another investigation affected by the Pre- Trial Chamber’s views can be 
found in paras. 17– 38 of the Closing Order in Case 004/ 2, online at https:// eccc.gov.kh/ en/ document/ 
court/ redacted- closing- order- indictment; my colleague’s views are available at paras. 8 ff. of his Dismissal 
Order D359 (not online at the time of writing).
 16 ECCC, Office of the Co- Investigating Judges, Combined decision on the impact of the budgetary situation etc., 
Case No. 004/ 2/ 07- 09- 2009- ECCC- OCIJ/ D349/ 6, of 11 August 2017— online at  https://www.eccc.gov.kh/ 
en/ document/ court/ combined- decision- impact- budgetary- situation- cases- 003- 004- and- 0042- and- related.
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2. PROVENANCE OF THE PARTICIPANTS
The PD and the OR differ markedly in their language as to who is talking in what capacity. 
The PD opens with
The representatives of international criminal courts and tribunals meeting at the French 
National School for the Judiciary in Paris on 16 October 2017  . . . 
whereas the OR conclude with
These recommendations were drafted and endorsed by the following international 
judges, acting in their personal capacities . . .17
The PD’s use of the word “representative/ représentant” may be a mere linguistic fluke18 
or have been chosen for want of a more accurate expression, yet the PD, as opposed to the 
OR, has the distinct ring of a quasi- official announcement. Two judges participated in both 
the PD and the OR— both of which incidentally worked/ had worked at the ICC— and it 
thus can be assumed that they at least did not in one instance wish to speak in their offi-
cial capacity, and in another in a purely personal one. Yet, the answer to the question re-
mains rather nebulous of how and by whom they were selected and invited to participate, 
whether the invitation was all- encompassing for judges of certain courts, whether and if 
so, how many judges declined the invitation and for which reasons etc. More transparency 
regarding that process, and possibly also publication of the minutes of the meetings/ pro-
ceedings (if such were taken) might have lent at least some support to the legitimacy of the 
selection of participants.19
Given that the PD was concerned only with international criminal courts, whereas the 
OR referred to the wider array of international courts and tribunals, the provenance of the 
participants was also different. Table 1 lists them by court; judges who had held positions 
at several courts were listed at each court they (had) served on, but that fact is pointed out 
clearly in the table to avoid double- counting in the attendance.
Fifty percent of the judges who drafted the PD were/ had been in high administrative 
positions in their courts, whereas with the OR, that percentage was just little over half that, 
namely 26.6%. It can be expected from experience that their exposure to managerial tasks at 
their courts may have coloured their views on the performance of their judicial colleagues 
and will also have sensitised them for, and possibly even have led to greater identification 
with, managerial needs, principles and processes. It is also striking that all PD judges came 
from international courts sitting in The Hague, whereas the OR court sample had a much 
 17 Emphases added in both quotes.
 18 However, the definition of the French “représentant” in the standard French dictionary Larousse (https://
www.larousse.fr/ dictionnaires/ francais/ repr%C3%A9sentant_ repr%C3%A9sentante/ 68480) lists four 
different meanings, all but one of which have a connotation of someone being formally entrusted with 
a position. The other one refers to a person being a model or type representing the qualities of a certain 
group etc., such as “She is a typical representative of the middle class.” That meaning can hardly have been 
what the PD drafters had in mind.— The same distinction between the meanings of “delegate” and “type” 
exists in English for the word “representative,” see https:// dictionary.cambridge.org/ dictionary/ english/ 
representative.
 19 Confidential requests by the author for information in this regard to persons involved in either event 
showed no specific method of selection other than possibly participation in previous joint events or other 
avenues of personal/ professional acquaintance.
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greater geographical diversity. The high proportion of, partly former, ICC judges may also 
have influenced the tone of the recommendations adopted in the PD, because these judges 
will have been more or less acutely aware of the strong criticism of their own court as the 
most visible and controversial of all international criminal tribunals.
It is so far unclear how many other judges have endorsed either the PD or OR. The 
webpages of the relevant fora did not list any endorsements at the time of writing. During 
my time at the ECCC, the PD was internally circulated among the judges for endorsement 
and while there seemed to be a number of judges supporting it according to the email 
traffic, I am unaware if any endorsements were ultimately forthcoming. I and at least one 
other colleague declined the invitation for reasons of principle.
3. PURPOSE OF THE PD AND OR
3.1.  Background Information
The webpage of the French Institut des Hautes Études sur la Justice, which hosted the discus-
sion preceding the adoption of the PD, lists this explanation (available in French only) for 
the exercise:
TABLE 1  Provenance of Judicial Participants to PD and OR
PD OR
 • ICTY 3 (of which one former now 
at kSC)
 • ICC 8 (of which one former now 
at kSC)
 • STL 1
 • kSC 2 (of which one each formerly at 
ICC and ICTY)
 • Total attendance: 12
 • ECCC 1
 • World Trade Organization Appellate Body 2
 • STL 1
 • African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights 1
 • International Court of Justice 2
 • Special Criminal Court for the Central African 
Republic 1
 • International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 1
 • European Court of Human Rights 1
 • Residual Mechanism for International Criminal 
Tribunals 1
 • ICC 2 (of which one former not at kSC)
 • Caribbean Court of Justice 1
 • kSC (formerly at ICC) 1
 • East African Court of Justice 1
 • Total attendance: 15
 • The kSC/ ICC judge and one ICC 
judge also participated in the OR.
 • 6 judges held/ had held positions as 
a president or vice- president at their 
court.
 • The kSC/ ICC judge and the ICC judge also 
participated in the PD.
 • 4 judges held/ had held positions as president or 
vice- president at their court.
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Fruit d’un consensus et du pluralisme des participants, les recommandations de ce doc-
ument de référence peuvent être appliquées quel que soit le système juridique envisagé 
(common law ou civil law). Elles s’avèrent donc particulièrement pertinentes dans le 
cadre de l’hybridation du droit mise en oeuvre par les cours et les tribunaux pénaux 
internationaux. Les propositions faites appellent à des changements de pratiques, à un 
dialogue continu entre les juges et les juridictions, et à la création éventuelle de nouveaux 
outils : fixation de délais indicatifs, phases procédurales successives non redondantes, 
rôle actif des présidents de chambre, corps international d’inspection commun, code de 
déontologie et formation continue, etc. Elles ne nécessitent pas de réformer ou réouvrir 
le Statut de Rome – qui célèbrera cette année ses 20 ans – et s’inscrivent dans une per-
spective opérationnelle centrée sur les pratiques pour assurer une plus grande rapidité dans la 
conduite des procédures, dégager des règles et des pratiques de bonne gouvernance et renforcer 
la crédibilité de la justice pénale internationale. [Emphasis added]20
The Brandeis Institute for International Judges (BIIJ), a sub- programme of the International 
Center for Ethics, Justice and Public Life of Brandeis University, carries the following ex-
planation on its website:
The aim of the institute was to examine carefully the various ways in which some in-
ternational courts are currently experiencing “pushback,” be it from member states, civil 
society groups, or even their own parent bodies. The World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Appellate Body, for example, finds itself at a critical juncture as the United States blocks 
all new appointments to its 7- member bench, thereby threatening to bring its impor-
tant trade dispute resolution work to a standstill. The International Criminal Court 
(ICC) has seen a move toward withdrawal by several member states in response to ac-
tion by its Prosecutor to examine crimes upon their territories. More generally, interna-
tional courts and tribunals feel a waning of the late 20th century enthusiasm and support 
for international justice institutions and realize that a proactive response may assist them in 
negotiating current conditions.
Judges discussed various strategies for countering their current difficulties and 
enhancing their institutions’ legitimacy in the eyes of diverse stakeholders. These strategies 
include establishing and conforming to codes of judicial ethics, ensuring the efficiency 
of their proceedings, and devising effective methods for communicating with the public. 
Attendees drafted a list of recommended strategies which they plan to share with the in-
ternational justice field upon finalization. [Emphases added.]21
The key concern that would appear to underlie both documents is found in the 
OR: “. . . enhancing their institutions’ legitimacy in the eyes of diverse stakeholders.” We shall 
examine, firstly, whether either of them will actually manage to do that, and, secondly, what 
is to be made of this emerging lens of analysis, which I choose to call the “external stake-
holder benevolence” paradigm: In this article, looking mainly from the judicial perspective, 
as do the PD and OR, i.e. from the position of the persons entrusted with ensuring due pro-
cess as well as fair and speedy trial, “stakeholder” has a selective, extraneous meaning not 
fully congruent with how it is used in the general business theory and ethics/ philosophical 
 20 See https:// ihej.org/ programmes/ justice- penale- internationale/ une- justice- penale- internationale- plus- 
efficace- la- declaration- de- paris- du- 16- octobre- 2017/ .
 21 See https://www.brandeis.edu/ ethics/ internationaljustice/ biij/ 2018.html.
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discussion22 that looks at the entire system, including the judiciary, from the outside: In this 
article, stakeholder means anyone with a political, financial or similar interest in the oper-
ation of international courts other than the judges, and equally other than the prosecution 
and the defence who directly interact with the judiciary in individual proceedings and sup-
port the aim of due process and fair and speedy trial.
The above- cited quote from the OR, however, permits the conclusion that the judges 
endorsing it did not include themselves within the ranks of the “diverse stakeholders” but saw 
them as extraneous entities before whom they had to justify themselves. The PD is not materi-
ally different in that sense. In an overall outside view of the interactional environment of inter-
national courts, they would, of course, be stakeholders, too. The position of victims would seem 
to be at least ambiguous, as they are often linked to advancing the wider policy movements, and 
in particular in non- governmental organisations (NGOs), about ending impunity, reparations 
etc., which are in turn connected to the official policies of why international courts are estab-
lished and supported. However, to the extent that they are reliant on funding and logistical 
support, for example, to perform their roles in individual proceedings, they are not external 
stakeholders themselves but affected by the decisions of other external stakeholders.
In essence, this article proceeds from the basic premise that a full stakeholder theory 
approach in its traditional sense, where every stakeholder gets to have an input into the 
decision- making process, is bound to break down when the decision about the “good” or 
“interest” against which other stakeholders’ interests are meant to be balanced, in this case 
due process and fair trial, has been assigned by law exclusively to one stakeholder, i.e. the 
judges, and all other stakeholders are barred from interfering with the process if this means 
encroaching upon the one stakeholder’s protected position, i.e. judicial independence, a 
concept the interpretation of which has also been assigned to the same stakeholder. As 
Bronik and Anja Matwijkiw have made clear,23 we are essentially dealing with a clash be-
tween fact- based economic realism and the value- based judicial environment: Simply put, 
the former wants to give as much justice as money allows, whereas the latter wants to have 
as much money as justice requires.24 The judicial default perspective on stakeholder- theory- 
based justification attempts at defining the contours and parameters of the core judicial en-
vironment will thus in principle always be one of intrusion, not one of mutual co- operation 
by equals with free discretion on a process of give- and- take.
3.2.  The PD and OR Preambles
These sentiments are repeated in substance, although not fully identically, in the preambles 
of the PD and OR. Table 2 provides a synopsis.
The PD seeks to place the efficiency and legitimacy aspect in the wider panorama of 
victims’ and defence positions such as speedy, expeditious and fair trial, whereas the OR 
straightforwardly address the issue of a “climate of waning support for many institutions 
 22 See on this debate more generally, Bronik Matwijkiw and Anja Matwijkiw, Stakeholder Theory and Justice 
Issues: The Leap from Business Management to Contemporary International Law, International Criminal 
Law Review 143 (2010).
 23 Ibid.
 24 See also Ernst Hirsch Ballin, The Value of International Criminal Justice: How Much International Criminal 
Justice Can the World Afford?, International Criminal Law Review (2018) advance article 
DOI:  https:// doi.org/ 10.1163/ 15718123- 01806003. He argues that this is asking the wrong question 
and that we should rather “be asking whether the international community, if it is still concerned about 
establishing trust and peace among nations, can afford to do away with international criminal justice.”
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of international justice and increasing challenges to their legitimacy.” The conclusion both 
draw is that international judges should become more efficient. The PD also makes express 
reference to courts being “accountable,” a term not used in the OR. The PD declares that 
“the following recommendations are conducive to making the conduct of the proceedings 
before international criminal courts and tribunals more expeditious and effective,” whereas 
the OR declare that “international courts should seek to conform to the recommendations 
below in order to enhance their institutional legitimacy.” In essence, the PD emphasises 
the deeper purpose for which international criminal courts were established and proceeds 
from there to the more organisational aspects, whereas the OR more or less immediately 
address the latter, presumably deeming the deep (criminal) justice background not worth 
discussing in detail, not least due to the wider remit of the type of courts in the OR, and 
possibly considering that point more as a given. The PD creates a justice policy problem for 
itself by the approach laid out in its preamble, as we will see.
TABLE 2  Preambles of PD and OR Compared
PD OR
Recalling that victims of serious violations of 
human rights and humanitarian law have a 
right to obtain justice and redress in a timely 
manner for the harms suffered;
Emphasizing the paramount importance 
of safeguarding the rights of suspects and 
accused;
Mindful that, in compliance with their 
founding texts, specific procedures should be 
devised and practices developed to cater to 
the complexity of the crimes these courts and 
tribunals must adjudicate;
Cognizant that while international courts and 
tribunals must be provided with the necessary 
resources to fulfil their mandate, they must 
also be accountable;
Stressing that the expeditiousness of 
proceedings is an integral component of 
a fair trial and is at the heart of a good 
administration of justice;
Declare that the following recommendations 
are conducive to making the conduct of the 
proceedings before international criminal 
courts and tribunals more expeditious and 
effective:
Aware of the current climate of waning 
support for many institutions of 
international justice and increasing 
challenges to their legitimacy;
Mindful that each international court has 
its own specific mandate, jurisdiction and 
institutional organization, and that any 
recommendations below must reflect these 
specificities;
Emphasizing that the primary work of 
international judges is to produce well- 
reasoned and timely judgments, which are 
seen to be so;
Recognizing that ensuring the legitimacy 
of international courts may still require 
more from both judges and their 
institutions;
The participants of the 2018 session of the 
Brandeis Institute for International Judges 
declare that international courts should 
seek to conform to the recommendations 
below in order to enhance their 
institutional legitimacy.
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4. ANALYSIS OF THE REASONING
I have alluded above that I have strong reservations about the merits of these documents 
in advancing the debate around efficiency and legitimacy, and regarding their added value 
in convincing the political actors in the international justice community to continue 
supporting the international courts. My quintessential concern is that the latter want to 
see deeds, not words by a very few people who in any event have no call or power to try to 
bind other independent judges to their views by exerting what can be called public peer 
pressure. Judges who do not agree with the thrust of the PD and OR now risk being seen as 
obstacles to “progress” and as averse to bringing the international judiciary into the twenty- 
first century.
Of course, it falls to each and every court to strive for efficiency in its own environ-
ment,25 which is after all a banality: Judges should simply try their best to “walk the walk” 
rather than “talk the talk” of being efficient, they should do rather than teach. Good prac-
tice can and should be shared between courts without the need for grandiose public 
declarations outside any existing reporting structures with the relevant stakeholders. It is 
ultimately for the judges, and the judges alone, to decide, which measures of efficiency they 
still deem compatible with their judicial independence and the guarantees surrounding the 
fairness and integrity of the proceedings. The presumption must be against allowing any 
external intrusion into a court’s judicial operations which are ultimately based on attempts 
at cost- cutting. There is no place, either, for anticipatory subservience of judges towards the 
wishes of the donor community. International justice, like any form of justice, is not to be 
had on the cheap. Geoffrey Robertson rightly said that
[c] ourts which are so starved of funds that they cannot do justice should close them-
selves down rather than continue under the expectation that sufficient funding will be 
forthcoming only if they render verdicts acceptable to the funding body.26
It is far from clear how much the PD and OR, and similar statements, can further the legit-
imate path to efficiency in substance rather than in appearance. However, there is a danger 
that even mere appearances can easily create expectations that will at some stage make mere 
words coalesce into substance, but not necessarily in the manner intended by their drafters.
The ideas contained in the PD and OR on the surface seem to be so “common sense” 
that we need to investigate the individual recommendations in both documents one by one 
and in the necessary detail. The fact that the PD’s and OR’s arguments do, of course, not 
proceed according to a common table of contents makes it more difficult to do this jointly, 
for example, by the use of a fully synoptic table. I will thus use the more extensive PD as its 
starting point and, where appropriate, insert the related recommendations from the OR in 
the discussion. All remaining issues in the OR will then be looked at separately in another 
section.
 25 A good example of how this can look in practice, and the difficulties surrounding such efforts, is provided 
by de Gurmendi, supra note 5.
 26 Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Judicial Independence), Prosecutor v.  Sam 
Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL- 2004- 14- AR72(E), 13 March 2004 – Separate Opinion of Justice Geoffrey 
Robertson, para. 3, online at https:// sierralii.org/ sl/ judgment/ special- court/ 2004/ 48.
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4.1.  Reasons for the Announcements
The reasons for the PD and OR can either be interpreted from the point of view of the 
drafters, or from the point of view of the audience, which, not to put too fine a point on it, is 
the international donor community for whose consumption they were after all intended in 
the first place. Their meaning then, as is beauty, is in the eyes of the beholder.
4.1.1.  Criminal Justice Aspects
The PD and the OR differ, as was described above, in their argumentative foundations as 
reflected in their preambles. The PD’s three justice- related reasons are, in that order:
Recalling that victims of serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law have a 
right to obtain justice and redress in a timely manner for the harms suffered;
Emphasizing the paramount importance of safeguarding the rights of suspects and 
accused;
Stressing that the expeditiousness of proceedings is an integral component of a fair trial 
and is at the heart of a good administration of justice;
The OR have no reference to such general considerations of justice.
4.1.1.1.  Emphasis on Victim- cEntrEd argumEnts
The PD’s first reason, the victims’ right to justice and redress, 27 is rather problematic as a lens 
through which to analyse the legitimacy and effectiveness of international courts. Victims 
have a right to a remedy,28 i.e. to the speedy treatment of their alleged grievances, they do not 
in effect have a right to “redress” against anyone unless a court finds that a particular person 
is responsible for the harm they suffered, and has established what that harm was.29
The general UN- supported definition of “victim” is clearly not linked to the precondi-
tion of the context or even outcome of a criminal trial, as evidenced by the Declaration of 
Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power of 29 November 198530 
(hereinafter: the 1985 Declaration) at para. 2:
A person may be considered a victim, under this Declaration, regardless of whether the 
perpetrator is identified, apprehended, prosecuted or convicted and regardless of the familial 
 27 Very revealing on the negotiation history of the Rome Statute regarding reparations and the notion 
that “you could not be seen to be ‘anti- victim’ at that time” the paper by Christoph Sperfeldt, Rome’s 
Legacy:  Negotiating the Reparations Mandate of the International Criminal Court, International 
Criminal Law Review 351 (2017)— quote at 368.
 28 See, e.g., Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 2 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination, Article 14 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Article 39 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and 
of international humanitarian law as found in Article 3 of the Hague Convention respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land of 18 October 1907 (Convention IV), Article 91 of the Protocol Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) of 8 June 1977.
 29 See for an evaluation of the victims’ position overall and in particular with regard to a recent EU initiative 
in that respect Kenneth S. Gallant, The Enforceability Deficit Concerning Victims’ Remedies, ICLR (2018) 
advance article at DOI 10.1163/ 15718123- 01806001, 15.
 30 See https://www.un.org/ documents/ ga/ res/ 40/ a40r034.htm.
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relationship between the perpetrator and the victim. The term “victim” also includes, 
where appropriate, the immediate family or dependants of the direct victim and persons 
who have suffered harm in intervening to assist victims in distress or to prevent victim-
ization. [Emphasis added.]
Paras. 4 and 5 of the 1985 Declaration clarify the meaning of the right as one of access to 
justice mechanisms:
Victims should be treated with compassion and respect for their dignity. They are 
entitled to access to the mechanisms of justice and to prompt redress . . . for the harm that 
they have suffered. [Emphasis added.]31
Judicial and administrative mechanisms should be established and strengthened 
where necessary to enable victims to obtain redress through formal or informal procedures 
that are expeditious, fair, inexpensive and accessible. Victims should be informed of 
their rights in seeking redress through such mechanisms. [Emphasis added.]
In Resolution 60/ 147 of 16 December 2005,32 the UN General Assembly (UNGA) 
adopted the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law (Basic Principles). The preamble makes clear that
[. . .] the Basic Principles and Guidelines contained herein do not entail new international 
or domestic legal obligations but identify mechanisms, modalities, procedures and methods 
for the implementation of existing legal obligations under international human rights law 
and international humanitarian law which are complementary though different as to 
their norms. [Emphasis added.]
The Basic Principles in their para. 9 repeat the 1985 Declaration’s decoupling of victim 
status from the existence of any criminal proceedings. Their para. 11 provides that
[r] emedies for gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations 
of international humanitarian law include the victim’s right to the following as provided 
for under international law:
 (a) Equal and effective access to justice;
 (b) Adequate, effective and prompt reparation for harm suffered;
 (c) Access to relevant information concerning violations and reparation mechanisms. 
[Emphasis added.]
This wording does not represent a shift in substance from the 1985 Declaration as far as the 
nature of the right is concerned. The PD would thus on the face of it appear to be modelled 
on the 1985 Declaration and the Basic Principles, yet it differs in one small but impor-
tant point in that the PD somewhat disingenuously conflates what is in essence a political 
 31 This concept is explained in more detail in para. 12 of the Basic Principles.
 32 See https:// daccess- ods.un.org/ TMP/ 6435390.11478424.html.
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announcement33 on victims’ rights in general34 with their rights against an individual de-
fendant in a particular criminal case, even more so because the ICC Appeals Chamber 
in the Lubanga Reparations Judgment of 3 March 2015 made it clear that every order for 
reparations must be made against the convicted person.35 The PD seems to apply a se-
mantic shift to the meaning of “justice,” as opposed to the 1985 Declaration and the Basic 
Principles, from procedural to material, or in other words, from process to outcome. De 
Hoon aptly calls the protagonists driving the policy agenda in international criminal justice 
“norm entrepreneurs”36 and she warns that the ICC in particular is subjected to a conflict 
of tasks and expectations, and their normative consequences, something which the policy 
aspect of victims’ rights is particularly prone to.37
The fundamental question that needs to be asked in a criminal justice context, as op-
posed to the political and/ or state responsibility context, is this: Whose victims are they 
and what harm is that person responsible for? The ICC Pre- Trial Chamber in its decision 
of 6 September 2018 on the ICC’s jurisdiction regarding the treatment of the Rohingya by 
Myanmar made that very clear.38 In other words, the rights of the victims before and during 
ongoing proceedings are first and foremost procedural rights akin39 to those of due process 
for the defence; the material right to, and the kind and amount of, reparations is de facto 
 33 The Basic Principles after all encourage states to adopt a victim- oriented approach in their preamble:
Convinced that, in adopting a victim- oriented perspective, the international community affirms its 
human solidarity with victims of violations of international law, including violations of international 
human rights law and international humanitarian law, as well as with humanity at large, in accordance 
with the following Basic Principles and Guidelines.
 34 Interestingly enough, the 2013 Resolution by the Assembly of States Parties (ASP), Doc. No. ICC- 
ASP/ 10/ Res.3, on Reparations in its para. 2 is in conflict with the spirit of the 1985 Declaration in its 
paras. 12– 13.
 35 No. ICC- 01/ 04- 01/ 06 A A 2 A 3 at paras. 64 ff.
 36 Marieke De Hoon, The Future of the International Criminal Court. On Critique, Legalism and Strengthening 
the ICC’s Legitimacy, International Criminal Law Review, 591 at 592 (2017).
 37 “In its justification for existence, the ICC and its proponents have created unrealistically high expectations 
of what a court [. . .] can do [. . .]. Credos like ‘ending impunity’ and ‘delivering justice’ would never be 
found credible in a domestic [. . .] system, since all criminal law can do is strive after reducing impunity and 
contributing to feelings that justice is served [.  .  .]. [S] uch strange and utopian promises should have no 
place in international criminal law.” De Hoon, ibid., 598.
 38 See ICC Pre- Trial Chamber, Case No. ICC- RoC46(3)- 01/ 18- 37, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Request 
for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute, 6 September 2018 at para. 88, online at 
https://www.icc- cpi.int/ Pages/ record.aspx?docNo=ICC- RoC46(3)- 01/ 18- 37:  “This means that the 
Prosecutor is mandated to respect the internationally recognized human rights of victims with regard to 
the conduct and result of her preliminary examination, especially the rights of victims to know the truth, 
to have access to justice and to request reparations, as already established in the jurisprudence of this Court. 
Moreover, the Chamber notes that the IACtHR has established that ‘it is necessary to act with special 
promptness when, owing to the design of the domestic laws, the possibility of filing a civil action for damages 
depends on the criminal proceeding.’ Within the Court’s legal framework, the victims’ rights both to par-
ticipate in the proceedings and to claim reparations are entirely dependent on the Prosecutor starting an in-
vestigation or requesting authorization to do so. The process of reparations is intrinsically linked to criminal 
proceedings, as established in article 75 of the Statute, and any delay in the start of the investigation is a delay 
for the victims to be in a position to claim reparations for the harm suffered as a result of the commission of 
the crimes within the jurisdiction of this Court.” (emphasis added).
 39 See in this sense the arguments advanced for an enhanced minimum standard of participatory victims’ 
rights by Anni Pues, A Victim’s Right to a Fair Trial at the International Criminal Court?, JICJ 951 (2017); 
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only triggered once a person has been found guilty by final verdict of committing crimes 
resulting in the harm which reparations are claimed for, and only once the nature and the 
extent of the harm have also been established. The practice at the ECCC has shown that 
even in the case of an indictment, not every civil party applicant, who may be a victim of 
the historical events in the wider sense, will necessarily be entitled to join the proceedings 
against a particular accused.40
The uncertain nature of the victims’ rights in international criminal justice as bound to 
the existence of a case and an individual offender is also evidenced by the fact that it is so far 
unclear whether they continue to exist upon the death of the defendant, because no statute 
of any international court provides for a liability of the accused’s heirs or estate for any repara-
tion awarded directly against the convicted person, for example, under Arts. 75(2), 109 ICC 
Statute, nor do the 1985 Declaration or the Basic Principles. (Draft provisions on the right 
of the successors of the victims41 to enforce previous judgments against the convicted person 
were dropped during the ICC Statute negotiations.42) This means that the matter seems to 
be left to the national jurisdictions, with curious and probably rather diverse consequences.
One example from a national system, colorandi causa, is the German law which under 
general domestic rules forbids the enforcement of fines into the convicted person’s estate 
after their death (§ 459c (3) German Code of Criminal Procedure— GCCP). The enforce-
ment of reparation orders by the ICC is regulated in § 45 of the Law on the Cooperation 
with the ICC (LCICC),43 which refers to § 43 LCICC for the enforcement procedure 
for fines, which in its sub- section (4)  in turn declares § 459c (3)  GCCP applicable, i.e. 
it treats a monetary reparation order made for the benefit of the victims like a fine and 
prohibits its enforcement into the estate or against the heirs. Enforcement of non- monetary 
reparations such as a public apology etc. is not foreseen at all by § 45 LCICC, and would 
in any event make little sense. Victims are, of course, not precluded from pursuing a claim 
in the civil courts against the estate but they may, for example, run up, as the case may be, 
against the barrier of the German law’s refusal to accept the superior responsibility variety 
of the superior’s not investigating or punishing previously committed crimes as a mode of 
liability for the crime committed by the subordinates— this form of liability is deemed ir-
reconcilable with the German idea of the Schuldprinzip, i.e. the requirement of prior fault 
by the offender, and § 15 of the Völkerstrafgesetzbuch (VStGB – Code of Crimes Against 
International Law44) makes this variety into a separate offence of dereliction of duty.  It is 
in a similar vein, Liesbeth Zegveld, Victims as a Third Party: Empowerment of Victims?, International 
Criminal Law Review (2017), advance article DOI: https:// doi.org/ 10.1163/ 15718123- 01806002.
 40 See, for a recent example, Case 004/ 2 against Ao An, Doc. No. D269, Order on admissibility of civil 
party applications, 28 November 2018, online at https://www.eccc.gov.kh/ en/ document/ court/ order- 
 admissibility- civil- party- applications.
 41 But see, for example, Art. 14 of the 1984 Torture Convention, which allows for compensation claims 
by the dependants of a person killed during torture, and is in line with the wide definition of the term 
“victim,” for example, in Rule 85 of the RPE- ICC. This is, however, a direct original, non- derivatory claim 
of the dependant and not the same as enforcing a previous award to the torture victim who died after the 
award; cf. William Schabas, The International Criminal Court, A Commentary on the Rome 
Statute (2010), 881– 882.
 42 David Donat- Cattin in Otto Triffterer & Kai Ambos, The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court— A Commentary, 3rd ed. (CH Beck/ Hart/ Nomos, 2016) (here-
inafter “Triffterer & Ambos”), Art. 75 fn. 61.
 43 See https://www.gesetze- im- internet.de/ istghg/ index.html.
 44 See https://www.gesetze- im- internet.de/ vstgb/ index.html; translation at https:// germanlawarchive.
iuscomp.org/ ?p=758.
36 “ E x T E R N A L  S T A k E H O L D E R  B E N E v O L E N C E ”
36
so far unclear whether the German courts would treat § 15 VStGB as a law meant to pro-
tect (also) the interests of individual natural or legal persons in the sense of tort law under 
§ 823(2) of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB – German Civil Code45), and not only the 
general public order.
4.1.1.2.  dEfEncE rights as an aftErthought?
It is unfortunate in the context of enhancing efficiency of proceedings, which appears to be 
equated mainly with greater speed by the PD, that the interests of the victims are listed before 
those of the defence, despite of the PD’s use of the term “paramount.”46 This is not in keeping 
with the general hierarchy found in the statutes of international criminal courts and tribunals 
which consistently use the expression “full respect for the rights of the defence and due regard for 
the protection of victims and witnesses.”47 In other words, in a case of conceptual conflict, the 
former must always trump the latter, as is clarified by Art. 68(1) ICC Statute: “These measures 
shall not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial 
trial.”48 Furthermore, the exhortation to have a “fair and expeditious trial” was originally meant 
to be in the interests of the defence (see also Art. 67(1)(c) ICC Statute), not the victims or even 
the donor community. The Basic Principles in para. 27 also restate this fundamental principle.49
The third reason of the PD could easily be seen as an attempt to recast speed, in the sense 
of facilitating the smooth running of the administration of justice, as an inherent quality of 
a fair trial— with the consequence that this new meaning, once it has been spliced into the 
DNA, thereby creating a new mutated strand of the fair trial principle, is then used to limit 
the original fair trial concept, by now interpreting the concept based on the induced mu-
tation.50 The drive for ever greater speed and cost- cutting, apart from endangering judicial 
independence and the “full, robust, and in- depth contemplation” of the issues at hand, has 
its most detrimental impact on the position of the defence, not least because international 
tribunals in particular have historically been, and still are, struggling with the implementa-
tion of the principle of equality of arms.51 Quite simply, a fair trial should be allowed to take 
 45 https://www.gesetze- im- internet.de/ englisch_ bgb/ englisch_ bgb.html#p3489.
 46 In this context, it is rather curious to read David Donat Cattin saying that the “role of the victims in the 
proceedings is that of the ‘guardians of the fairness of the prosecution, not agents in search for retribution’.” 
Triffterer & Cattin, 2016, Art. 75 fn. 52.
 47 See only Art. 64(2) ICC Statute.
 48 See also the draft Articles 11 and 12 of the ILC Drafting Committee on Crimes Against Humanity of 
26 May 2017, Texts and titles of the draft preamble, the draft articles and the draft annex provisionally 
adopted by the Drafting Committee on first reading, UN Doc. A/ CN.4/ L.892.
 49 “Nothing in this document is to be construed as derogating from internationally or nationally protected rights 
of others, in particular the right of an accused person to benefit from applicable standards of due process.”
 50 One is reminded of Goethe’s dictum in the Zahme Xenien II: “Im Auslegen seid frisch und munter! Legt 
ihr’s nicht aus, so legt was unter.” The translation: “Be bold, expound, read something out,” listed in Derek 
Glass, Goethe in English— A Bibliography of the Translations in the Twentieth Century 
(Maney Publishing, 2005), 72 at 162, does not quite catch the meaning of that phrase. A better transla-
tion seems to be that by Belinda Cooper of Georg Jellinek, Constitutional Amendment and Constitutional 
Transformation (1906), in Weimar— A Jurisprudence of Crisis (Arthur Jacobson & Bernhard Schlink 
eds., University of California Press, 2000), 56: “Be bright and lively in expounding, if you can’t expound, 
then pound it in.” It means that if traditional methods of interpretation do not allow to draw a clear (or 
desired) meaning out of a provision, then the text interpreters should interpret their own (preferred) un-
derstanding into the provision.
 51 Stefania Negri, The Principle of “Equality of Arms” and the Evolving Law of International Criminal Procedure, 
International Criminal Law Review, 513 (2005).
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as long as it takes to present and test the evidence in a sound and thorough fashion under 
the circumstances of each individual case. This still leaves sufficient room to look for effi-
ciency savings, finding and sharing good practice, and restricting sharp practices from the 
parties, including the prosecution and the defence, by an experienced bench.
4.1.2.  Institutional Framework Aspects
Both the PD and the OR in their preambles relate to the need for embedding efficiency 
mechanisms in each court’s institutional structure52 and set- up, based, one would assume, 
on their statutes and the rules of procedure and evidence.
PD OR
Mindful that, in compliance with their founding 
texts, specific procedures should be devised 
and practices developed to cater to the 
complexity of the crimes these courts and 
tribunals must adjudicate;
[Emphases added.]
Mindful that each international court has 
its own specific mandate, jurisdiction and 
institutional organization, and that any 
recommendations below must reflect these 
specificities;
This realisation represents a significant and detracting qualifier on the ubiquity with 
which the PD and OR can be applied across different tribunals. The recommendations of 
the PD and the OR sound like straightforward emanations of common- sense thinking, yet 
the devil is often in the detail:
 • Focusing on the criminal tribunals, this means different approaches may have to be 
found depending on whether a court subscribes to an adversarial, an inquisitorial/ 
judge- led or a mixed model to begin with.
 • How will the recommendation affect tribunals which are hybrid and possibly in prin-
ciple even subject to the law of a certain host state, like the ECCC?
 • The more advanced and detailed the procedural law— and established practice— of a 
court already is, the more difficult it will be to implement changes.
 • Who is entitled to make such changes? If we look only at the example of the ICC, that 
may either be the ASP or the judges, depending on the structural level in the norm 
hierarchy at which a change is made.
 • Can a change simply be made by judicial practice without adapting a relevant 
provision?
 • What about judicial independence in the application of the law— can some sort of a 
mere “Code of Good Practice,” possibly passed by a mere majority of a court’s judges, 
demand the other judges’ compliance, especially absent any rule of stare decisis on the 
international level or in civil- law- based courts?
 • Linked to the previous concern: How will conflicts between codes of practice and the 
applicable law be solved, and by whom?
These are only a few questions that come to mind. Of course, the PD in particular contains 
a few more detailed recommendations in this context which will be looked at later.
 52 The OR contain a section on judicial recruitment which will be looked at separately below at 4.1.2.2.
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4.1.3.  Accountability Aspects
Both PD and OR contain exhortations about courts and judges being more pro- active and 
accountable.
PD OR
Cognizant that while international courts 
and tribunals must be provided with the 
necessary resources to fulfil their mandate, 
they must also be accountable;
Recognizing that ensuring the legitimacy of 
international courts may still require more 
from both judges and their institutions;
Budget accountability and the need for establishing efficient workflow procedures are, of 
course, not per se objectionable. That sort of accountability rests with the court adminis-
tration regarding the budget and any streamlining of administrative support for the judicial 
core business, for which judicial input should be sought as a matter of course. Accountability 
for core judicial conduct, i.e. decision- making and compliance with judicial ethics, is pro-
vided by the appellate structures for the genuine judicial case work, and by the discipli-
nary procedures for breaches of judicial ethics. Art. 112(2)(b) ICC Statute, for example, 
provides for an independent oversight mechanism (IOM) at the ASP,53 which is, however, 
restricted to the administrative work of the Presidency, the Prosecutor and the Registrar. 
ASP Resolution ICC- ASP/ 12/ Res. 6, which was— in our context rather tellingly— based 
on consensus with the ICC’s three main organs (Presidency, Prosecutor and Registry)54 
expressly provides in its para. 27 that
[t] he authority of the IOM does not in any way impede the authority or independence 
granted by the Rome Statute to the Presidency, judges, Registrar or Prosecutor of the 
Court. In particular, the IOM will fully respect the judicial and prosecutorial independ-
ence and its activities will not interfere with the effective functioning of the Court.
Oversight of any kind will pose a serious problem when the external budgetary and admin-
istrative accountability of the court as a whole is meant to pierce the veil of judicial inde-
pendence in both its aspects, personal independence (security of tenure and emoluments 
etc.) and independence in decision- making. The report by the UN Advisory Committee on 
Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) on the ECCC of 27 October 201755 
amply demonstrates what this can mean for individual judges:
Court management
In addition, the report of the Secretary- General states that in May 2017 the  
co- investigating judges indicated their intention to request a permanent stay on judi-
cial proceedings in cases 003, 004 and 004/ 02 owing to their deep concerns about the 
Court’s funding situation. They subsequently decided to defer the decision on a stay. 
Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that, pursuant to rule 73 of the 
internal rules of Extraordinary Chambers, the decision of the co- investigating judges to 
 53 On the development and the mandate, see S. Rama Rao & Philipp Ambach in Triffterer & Ambos. Article 
112, mn. 59 ff.
 54 Ibid., mn. 61.
 55 UN Doc. A/ 72/ 7/ Add. 7.
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permanently stay the proceedings may be subject to appeal to the Pre- Trial Chamber. 
The Committee notes that, pursuant to paragraphs 9 and 10 of the terms and 
conditions of service for the judges of the Extraordinary Chambers, provided to 
it upon request, international judges are subject to the authority of the Secretary- 
General in respect of all matters of a non- judicial nature arising in connection with 
or related to their service. [Emphasis in bold in the original.]56
That paragraph could easily be interpreted as an attempt at restricting the reach of judicial 
independence simply by deeming anything budget- related a court management issue, i.e. an 
administrative matter, and hence making the judge subject to the UNSG’s line- management.
The language of the OR about realising that still more may be required from judges 
and their institutions is entering dangerous territory: It is the hallmark of neo- liberal ide-
ology, the mechanics of which were trenchantly analysed by Michel Foucault, to shift the 
realisation of alleged shortcomings in their role to the individual who is said to cause them, 
with the aim of making the individual subjugate themselves to the external message that 
it is they who (always) need to do more and who are to blame for not keeping up with 
requirements, thus causing them to become their own ever- critical supervisors and to 
internalise the psychological self- blaming culture, which incessantly “requires still more,” 
and which is so prevalent in the modern workplace. I have written elsewhere about this in 
the context of the phenomenon of the commodification of justice and refer to what I said 
there.57 My Cambodian colleague at the ECCC and I, referring inter alia to a paper by Birju 
Kotecha, expressed our concerns in 2017 by holding that the increasingly executive- driven 
trend in the direction of applying managerial criteria to judicial core activities is “either 
 56 Ibid., para. 13.
 57 Commodification of Justice— A personal view on managerial performance indicators in the judicial context, in 
Contemporary Trends in Justice Systems (al- Qasimi, Mohammed eds., United Arab Emirates 
University (UAEU) Press, 2018), 9.  In essence, I  argued as follows:  The lens of Foucauldian discourse, 
and in particular Foucault’s views on the hidden technologies of governmentality controlling the behaviour 
of human beings, with the perfect means of control being full internalisation of the controllers’ agenda by 
triggering a seemingly voluntary self- subjection, either by knowing alignment with the underlying agenda 
or through its subconscious acceptance, is helpful in this context. In his work, Discipline and Punish, Michel 
Foucault argues that corporal punishments were replaced by a system which subjects it to continuous and 
total monitoring, in order to control it and prevent deviant behaviour. In the chapter entitled “Panopticism” 
he refers to Bentham’s idea of the panopticon, a form of prison architecture consisting of individual cells 
assembled around a central tower from which each inhabitant can be monitored at any time without 
noticing himself that he is being watched. Its ultimate aim is the impression of constant visibility and flowing 
from that, the creation of self- monitoring by and a consequential adaptation of the person’s behaviour. This 
behavioural adaptation, in Foucault’s view, leads to a state of affairs where the object of the surveillance si-
multaneously becomes the subject of their own submission.— See Michel Foucault, Panopticism, available 
online in Race/ Ethnicity: Multidisciplinary Global Contexts, Vol. 2, No. 1, The Dynamics of 
Race and Incarceration: Social Integration, Social Welfare, and Social Control (Indiana 
University Press), at https://www.jstor.org/ stable/ 25594995, 6 f.; German translation in Überwachen 
und Strafen (Suhrkamp), 16th ed., 2016, 258– 260. Against the background of effective incentives for uni-
formity (career progression etc.) there is a danger that judges, despite the constitutional protection of their 
independ ence, may strive for showing compliance with overriding external policy objectives, some of which 
they might even share for their own ideological or political reasons. Such conformism may eventually lead to 
a looser view of the question of whether to prefer speed over due process, and that speed is not the same as 
efficiency, risking miscarriages of justice and that subscribing to the managerial target- setting attitude may 
lead to preferring quantity over quality and ultimately to a change in judicial role perception away from dis-
passionate truth- finder/ mediator to self- motivated results- oriented manager.
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bound to end as an exercise in futility or risks making dangerous inroads to the judicial self- 
perception.”58 Sara Kendall aptly identifies the neo- liberal impact in international criminal 
law, when she writes with regard to the ICC:
International criminal law has adopted a neoliberal orientation, in the sense that neolib-
eralism draws market- based rationalities into traditionally non- market- based domains 
[.  .  .] In reading the work of the Court through the related optics of political interest 
and material conditions of possibility, claims regarding “global justice” through inter-
national criminal law appear in a different light. What emerges through this interpre-
tive prism is a juridical field preoccupied by concerns with the oikos – investments and 
efficiencies – while sidelining matters of the polis, such as deliberation and accounta-
bility. While the Court and its proponents speak in the name of a universalist “interna-
tional community”, its shareholder constituency is partial and particular, with its own 
political commitments and seeking a “return” on its juridical investments. [.  .  .] Such 
expressions may be read as an uptake of neoliberal reasoning, extending the logic of the 
market to claims about “global justice”, yet they arguably reveal even more about the pol-
itics of membership in the ICC’s political economy. [. . .] This appeal to balance as a pri-
ority reveals the paradox or dilemma at the heart of the ICC’s claim to “global justice”. In 
order to secure sufficient political will to continue to appeal to its states parties (and by 
extension, to receive strong budgetary support), the ICC has to cast itself as more am-
bitious than it can be: hence its overdetermined claims to “ending impunity”, “restoring 
the dignity of victims” and “bringing a sustainable peace”. At the same time, its essen-
tially retributive framework and focus on prosecuting a small number of individuals 
limits the ICC, which must market itself to states parties while drawing upon labour 
from an informal economy of intermediaries and volunteers.59
4.1.4.  Aspects of Judicial Self- perception
Both the PD and OR contain markers that point to a particular judicial self- image 
propounded by the signatories. They can be broadly distinguished into the following 
categories:
 • Judicial ethics
 • Judicial efficiency
 • Judicial transparency
 • Judicial public relations
4.1.4.1.  Judicial Ethics aspEcts
Here, as with the subsequent efficiency aspects, the PD is more detailed than the OR, and 
there is only partial overlap in the actual recommendations.
 58 See ECCC, Co- Investigating Judges, Combined decision on the impact of the budgetary situation etc., 
Case No. 004/ 2 / 07- 09- 2009- ECCC- OCIJ/ D349/ 6, of 11 August 2017, online at https://www.eccc.gov.
kh/ en/ document/ court/ combined- decision- impact- budgetary- situation- cases- 003- 004- and- 0042- and- 
related, at para. 43, with reference to Birju Kotecha, The ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor and the Limits of 
Performance Indicators, Journal of International Criminal Justice (2017) 543 at 555: “In short, 
audit indicators may deeply implant audit values within professional identities. This may lead personnel to 
change their vision about who they professionally are and what it is they do.”
 59 Sara Kendall, Commodifying Global Justice, Journal of International Criminal Justice 113 at 117 
and 132– 133 (2015).
41
PD OR
Call upon each Judge, regardless of his or her 
legal system of origin, to apply the normative 
framework governing the court or tribunal of 
which he or she is a member;
Recall that, without prejudice to their 
respective responsibilities, there is a genuine 
interdependency between each organ of the court 
or tribunal, as well as between the Presidency and 
the Judges and Presiding Judges, which should 
be capitalized upon through dialogue in order to 
improve the expeditiousness and effectiveness of 
proceedings;
Ensure regular and ongoing communication 
between the Judges concerning professional 
practices, in a manner consistent with their 
independence;
Promote, in keeping with the respective 
responsibilities of those involved in the trial, a 
dignified and constructive atmosphere for the 
hearings;
Adopt codes of conduct for Judges, in line with 
international standards and drawing inspiration 
from national practices in this area;
Establish suitable disciplinary mechanisms in 
order to ensure that adopted codes of conduct 
are respected and to guarantee impartiality, the 
appearance of impartiality and the dignity of 
the disciplinary process. As far as possible use 
investigative bodies which are external to the 
relevant court or tribunal and entrust decision 
making to a separate panel of the Assembly of the 
Judges of the court or tribunal. Consideration 
could be given to establishing an investigative 
and decision- making body common to all 
international criminal courts and tribunals;
Promote the continuous education of Judges and 
Legal Officers, including through partnerships 
with national academies for the training of 
Judges.
Emphasizing that the primary work of 
international judges is to produce well- 
reasoned and timely judgments, which 
are seen to be so;
Each international court should have a 
code of judicial ethics whose provisions 
are well known to judges.
Judges should behave in a manner 
that does not cast doubt upon 
their independence, integrity, and 
impartiality.
In situations where serious ethics 
violations by a judge are alleged and 
require an investigation, consideration 
should be given to the appointment of 
an external committee, provided the 
institution allows such a procedure, 
composed of individuals with 
relevant knowledge and experience, to 
conduct the investigation and make 
recommendations.
Judges should remain aware that 
producing well- reasoned judgments, 
based on the applicable law, remains 
their central role and the lynchpin of 
their institution’s legitimacy.
Dissenting or separate opinions, if 
allowed by the institution, should be 
delivered with restraint and formulated 
in respectful language so as not to 
undermine the authority of the court.
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The first PD recommendation is a restatement of the obvious that judges should apply the 
law of their respective courts regardless of their own jurisdiction of origin, yet in its sim-
plicity this exhortation seems to overlook the difficulties in practice of arriving at a joint 
interpretation of the law. It has been the bane of international criminal justice from the very 
beginning that legal concepts, the meaning of which appears straightforward for everyone 
in their own system, begin to oscillate when brought together with preconceptions from 
other legal backgrounds. This is particularly true when we consider the task of determining 
the content of customary international law built on state practice and opinio iuris, yet it 
holds no less true in principle for treaty- based institutions like the ICC.60 Anthea Roberts 
in her recent monograph “Is International Law International?”61 has shown impressively 
that there is a myriad of different and competing factors that influence the debate about the 
role and content of international law. I myself have repeatedly emphasised that the tools for 
finding customary law become even blunter when we look at the field of criminal law:62 This 
area, with all its intricate sub- disciplines of doctrine and case law in substantive law and 
procedure, was never foremost in the mind of international diplomats and politicians when 
setting up international criminal tribunals, and they left it to the judges to deal with the 
details— a lesson learned at least in part during the negotiations of the Rome Statute, which 
reserved the power to make the ICC’s RPE to the ASP, with only emergency decisions 
Between ASP meetings left to the judges. The political desideratum of having geographical, 
and hence systemic, diversity on the bench comes at a price and does not necessarily con-
tribute to the smooth running of the process of law- finding, especially so
 • when the court has jurisdiction over events occurring in a country with its own devel-
oped legal system, but no clear provision is made to apply that country’s law,
 • or if an international “override clause” is inserted into the Statute,63
 • or if the judges decide to interpret the Statue in a way that allows introducing such an 
override through the back- door.64
The second PD item on the factual interdependency of the judges, the prosecution and the 
registry in the process of running a court is again a banality from the point of view of practice. 
 60 See, for example, only Art. 21 ICC Statute.
 61 Anthea Roberts, Is International Law International? (Oxford University Press, 2017).
 62 See my papers Radbruch Redux:  The need for revisiting the conversation between common and civil 
law at root level at the example of international criminal justice. [2011] Leiden Journal of International 
Law 393; Nullum crimen sine poena— Zur Unberechenbarkeit völkerstrafrechtlicher Lehrenbildung. In 
Freiheitsverluste in Recht, Rechtsregime und Gesellschaft in Heiner Alwart et al. (eds.) (Mohr Siebeck, 
2014, 45); Language, intellectual culture, legal traditions and international criminal justice [2014] Journal 
of International Criminal Justice, 2014, 491.
 63 See, for example, Art. 24(1) ICTY Statute: “In determining the terms of imprisonment, the Trial Chambers 
shall have recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia.” 
This phrase, in connection with Rule 101 of the RPE- ICTY, was interpreted by the ICTY from its earliest 
days as allowing recourse to other considerations than merely the sentencing framework of the former 
Yugoslavia, based among other things on “the special nature and purpose of the International Tribunal.” 
See Case No. IT- 94- 1- T, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Sentencing Judgment of 14 July 1997, at para. 9, and the 
related Judgement in Sentencing Appeals, Case No. IT- 94- 1- A, of 26 January 2000, at para. 21, where the 
Appeals Chamber argued in effect that, inter alia, the— after all judge- made— RPE exempted the court 
from abiding by the maximum sentences applicable under the previous Yugoslav law.
 64 See my paper “Statute? What Statute?” Norm hierarchy and judicial law- making in international criminal law 
at the example of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Statute Law Review 186 (2014).
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However, the utilisation of this interconnectedness finds its boundaries, on the one hand, 
at the independence of each individual judge— a point often overlooked— and the reluc-
tance, both among the judiciary and the prosecution, to make prosecutors accountable for 
misconduct to the court, for example, via the contempt power. The ICTY very early on in 
Furundzija65 refused to subject prosecutorial misconduct to its own disciplinary regime, and 
instead referred the matter to the disciplinary oversight of the Prosecutor. While defence 
counsel and former staff members66 have been held in contempt, no such case is reported 
about a prosecution attorney for their conduct during the proceedings— yet, the law as such 
does not require such judicial restraint. Finally, the recommendation as it stands does not 
take into account the highly important need to have good relations with the defence,67 and 
similarly to the victims’ representatives. A non- confrontational approach especially vis- à- vis 
the defence often helps progress a case much more than any purely internal managerial tools 
designed within the institution.68 However, as with the judges, any such cooperation finds its 
limits in the independence of counsel and the zealous representation of the client’s interests.
The third point of the PD on regular communications on good practice within the limits of 
independence, presents yet another platitude for anyone who was socialised into their home 
judiciary before joining the international arena: A new judge will invariably be appointed to 
the bench in a court or district where there are older, more experienced judges already serving. 
In some countries, especially those with a career judiciary, a novice will often be assigned to 
a panel, where the daily interactions with one’s “elder brethren” provides ample opportunity 
to discuss ways of making one’s life easier by using tried- and- tested pragmatic approaches, 
notwithstanding the fact that even the new judge enjoys full independence within the panel. 
This exchange of views and knowledge transfer can be done over a cup of coffee in the judges’ 
common room, during deliberations, or in a quiet corner of the cafeteria over lunch. There is in 
particular no need for “away- days” which have increasingly become the fashionable thing to do 
in a variety of organisational contexts.
However, this may not ring true for everyone on the international level, where even the 
“novices” are almost without exception rather advanced in age and often close or (well) 
beyond their 50th birthday. The need for such away- days may be evidenced by the press 
release of the ICC of 28 September 2018 on the judges holding a retreat over two days fo-
cusing on “collegiality” and various other procedural aspects.69 It may be unsurprising that 
 65 Prosecutor v.  Anto Furundzija, Case No. IT- 95- 17/ 1- PT, The Trial Chamber’s Formal Complaint to the 
Prosecutor Concerning the Conduct of the Prosecution, 5 June 1998, at paras. 11 and 12, online at https://
www.icty.org/ x/ cases/ furundzija/ related/ en/ 980605e.pdf.
 66 So, for example, at the ICTY, Milan Vujin, Vojislav Seselj, Florence Hartmann, and at the ICC Jean- Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Jena- Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle Babala Wandu, and 
Narcisse Arido.
 67 It bears remembering that the statutes of all international(ised) courts tend to treat the prosecution as a 
part of the institution, whereas the defence rarely, if ever, gets any institutional standing. Even if there is 
an office for the defence, its chief will not have the same standing as the chief prosecutor, and any inter-
national defence counsel organisation is yet to address either the UN Security Council or the General 
Assembly.
 68 It may admittedly not come easily to many of those conditioned in the “no impunity” environment that the 
defence is not the “enemy.”
 69 See https://www.icc- cpi.int/ Pages/ item.aspx?name=pr1412. It may have been necessary to have such a 
meeting if the normal informal flow of communication at the ICC had indeed dried up, but one could be 
forgiven for questioning the wisdom of issuing a press release about it, which, contrary to its authors’ inten-
tion of showcasing their efforts at being good colleagues, will in effect have done nothing but impart to the 
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this retreat came so shortly after the highly contentious Bemba appeals majority ruling of 8 
June 2018.70 The President, Judge Eboe- Osuji, is reported as having
[.  .  .] emphasised the importance of cultivating a collegial judicial culture: “The judi-
ciary of the ICC and the Court more broadly stand to benefit tremendously from a 
commitment to an open, respectful, dignified and inclusive approach to institutional 
decision- making by the judges. That is to say, it is highly desirable to cultivate a cohesive 
and constructive environment marked by the highest degree of dignity and respect for 
one another, encouraging judges to share their diverse expertise, experience and profes-
sional backgrounds to the benefit of the Court.”71
This leads to the next PD recommendation, the promotion of a dignified and constructive 
atmosphere in the proceedings, and the related OR recommendation that judges should 
always act in a manner consistent with their independence, integrity and impartiality, and 
that dissenting or separate opinions should use restraint and respectful language in order 
to avoid undermining the authority of the court.72 Again, a banality, yet all seems not well 
in that respect, either. The impact of judicial discord on individual proceedings was, for 
example, brought into sharp relief by another source through the public decision of Judge 
Meron at the International Residual Mechanism of Criminal Tribunals (MICT73) in the 
Karadzic appeal proceedings of 27 September 2018:74 Meron had been disqualified by 
Judge Antonetti from sitting on the Mladic appeal a few weeks earlier, based on appearance 
of bias because Meron had already sat on appeals related to Mladic’s subordinates. Judge 
Meron appeared rather exercised about Antonetti’s reasoning and, in what looks almost 
like an act of sheer defiance, decided to withdraw from the case, despite the fact that (a) the 
accused had explicitly stated that he did not consider Judge Meron to be actually biased and 
(b) that Meron did not consider himself biased, either. The language is revealing:
OBSERVING that the Mladic Disqualification Decision clearly contradicts established ju-
risprudence and, in my view, harms the interests of the Mechanism by wrongly suggesting that 
“there is a risk in terms of appearance where the superior officer [. . .] is being tried, even 
on appeal, by the judge who found his subordinates guilty”; [. . .]
CONSIDERING that, in these circumstances, allowing Judge Antonetti to adjudicate 
yet another motion [. . .] is, in my view, liable to delay the proceedings in this case and 
further harm the interests of the Mechanism;
wider global audience the fact that there is discord among the ICC’s judges to such a degree that a proper 
meeting on the matter needed to be held.
 70 See Prosecutor v.  Jean- Pierre Bemba Gombo, Judgement, Case No. ICC- 01/ 05- 01/ 08 A, 8 June 2018; 
with a joint separate opinion by Judges Van den Wyngaert and Morrison at ICC- 01/ 05- 01/ 08- 3636- Anx2, 
and a separate opinion by Judge Eboe- Osuji at ICC- 01/ 05- 01/ 08- 3636- Anx3; joint dissenting opinion of 
Judges Monageng and Hofmanski at ICC- 01/ 05- 01/ 08- 3636- Anx- 1- Red.
 71 Ibid. (fn. 70).
 72 Although, of course, a persuasive and trenchant dissent fortiter in re but suaviter in modo can— and is often 
meant to— undermine the authority of the majority’s argument.
 73 This abbreviation was chosen at the time despite the fact that the acronym should have been IRMCT; the 
webpage URL is now https://www.irmct.org. The previous URL https://www.unmict.org automatically 
links the user to the new URL.
 74 Prosecutor v.  Radovan Karadzic, Case No. MICT- 13- 55- A, Decision, of 27 September 2018, online at 
http:// jrad.unmict.org/ webdrawer/ webdrawer.dll/ webdrawer/ rec/ 242289/ view/ .
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OBSERVING that Karadzic “has appreciated [my] procedural fairness during the 
appeal and [my] extraordinary concern for his health and detention conditions” and 
that Karadzic expressly “does not contend that [I] am actually biased against him”;
EMPHASIZING that I  would continue to adjudicate the Karadzic Case with an 
impartial mind;
CONSIDERING, however, that in order not to allow disqualification proceedings 
to impede the progress of the appeals in this case, it is in the interests of justice that 
I withdraw from this case; [Emphases added.]75
The public use of such acerbic language by one judge against another, which was, of course, 
also duly reported in the relevant media,76 does not augment public confidence in the ju-
dicial qualities mentioned by both the PD and the OR. Which is why both the PD and the 
OR also rightly call for the implementation of codes of judicial ethics, something which is 
still not the case in every international(ised) tribunal. However, where these codes exist, 
they are (a) public record and (b) contain specific provisions in point that (c) almost in ver-
batim language address exactly many of the issues which the signatories to the PD seemed 
so much in need of re- emphasising to the interested public, and which had, for example, 
also been elaborated in extenso in the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct.77
Both the PD and the OR call for the establishment of rigorous disciplinary enforcement 
mechanisms, with an emphasis on the use of external investigators/ examiners, and in the 
case of the PD, also for consideration of creating a common disciplinary body for all inter-
national criminal courts and tribunals. The use of external investigators is unobjectionable, 
as long as the majority of the panel consists of judges. The KSC Code of Judicial Ethics 
in Arts. 15 ff78 may serve as an example: Complaints that are not obviously vexatious are 
referred to the Disciplinary Board by the President; the Board consists of three members, 
two of whom must be judges, from either international or domestic courts, with extensive 
experience in the investigation of professional misconduct. The third member may be a 
senior appointee by the EU. The Board makes recommendations, which in the case of a 
finding of improper conduct, are transmitted by the President to the Plenary of Judges for 
decision. In the case of the ICC, Art. 46 of the Statute requires a two- thirds majority recom-
mendation by the other ICC judges for the ASP to be able to remove a judge from office; 
the investigation is done by the Presidency under Rule 26 ICC- RPE, assisted by one or 
more judges assigned by automatic rotation; the Presidency then reports to the Plenary for 
decision. Disciplinary measures short of removal are taken by the Presidency itself (Rule 
 75 Ibid (fn. 75)— footnotes omitted.
 76 See only the following selection of results from a simple Google search: https://www.jurist.org/ news/ 2018/ 09/ 
judge- withdraws- from- karadzic- appeal- in- bosnian- war- case/ ; https://www.justiceinfo.net/ en/ live- feed/ 39024- 
top- un- judge- withdraws- from- karadzic- case.html; https://www.france24.com/ en/ 20180927- top- un- judge- 
withdraws- karadzic- case; https:// sg.news.yahoo.com/ top- un- judge- withdraws- karadzic- case- 145401274.html; 
https://www.balkaninsight.com/ en/ article/ presiding- judge- withdraws- from- radovan- karadzic- s- appeal- 09- 27- 
2018; https://www.dailymail.co.uk/ wires/ ap/ article- 6214625/ Presiding- judge- withdraws- Radovan- Karadzic- 
appeal- case.html.
 77 See, for example, for the KSC at https://www.scp- ks.org/ en/ documents/ code- judicial- ethics- judges- 
appointed- roster- international- judges- 14- mar- 2017, Arts. 5 and 8; for the ICC at https://www.icc- 
cpi.int/ pages/ item.aspx?name=icc- cje, Arts. 5 and 8; see the Bangalore Principles at https://www.
judicialintegritygroup.org/ jig- principles.
 78 Online at https://www.scp- ks.org/ en/ documents/ code- judicial- ethics- judges- appointed- roster- international- 
judges- 14- mar- 2017.
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30 ICC- RPE). The salient point is that the investigation and the decision on sanctions must 
remain in the hands of judges.
It will be difficult, to say the least, to establish a common disciplinary regime for all 
international criminal courts with a meaningful portfolio: The KSC is de facto run by the 
EU, the ICC is an independent treaty- based body merely partly affiliated with the UN, 
the ICTY and ICTR and now the RMICT are under the aegis of the UN, courts like the 
ECCC, the Special Court for Sierra Leone and its Residual Court, the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon and the local war crimes courts in Kosovo and Bosnia, for example, are instances 
of hybrid courts with UN involvement, but are also comprised of local judges who are not 
normally subject to international oversight. And why restrict it to criminal courts, and not 
include other international courts such as, for example, the CJEU, the GCEU, the ECtHR, 
the IACtHR, ITLOS etc.? It would in any event take a major diplomatic and political ef-
fort to establish such a joint oversight mechanism and to ensure that it is under full judicial 
control, because this would be the first (albeit welcome) step towards the institutional in-
dependence of the international judiciary, something States are unlikely to agree to because 
of the loss of control it would entail. I had some time ago advocated considering the estab-
lishment of a General Council of Judges on the international level,79 which could take up 
some of the functions alluded to in the PD and OR, among a wider array of competences. 
However, the very reason for the PD’s and OR’s announcement, i.e. the increasingly critical 
stance of states towards international judicial bodies, makes it seem like science fiction to 
entertain the prospect of such an idea coming to fruition anytime soon.
The PD’s exhortation to let judges and legal officers engage in continuing profes-
sional development (CPD) is something I  have experienced at the domestic level and 
have advocated myself for the international judiciary,80 but it needs to be extended to pre- 
deployment education, something that is sorely lacking and which would allow judges and 
staff to hit the ground running, or at least walking faster than at a crawl. It is obvious that 
any time taken for meaningful training may be lost for the work on the actual cases, yet the 
time taken for training may very well pay off later.
I have serious reservations, however, against the OR’s idea of what the “central role and 
lynchpin” of a judge’s task is, i.e. writing well- reasoned judgments based on the applicable law, 
that “are seen to be so.” Not all judges write judgments— investigating judges, for example, 
do not— and in fact most of the output of trial and appellate judges are not judgments but 
(interlocutory) orders and decisions. Even assuming that the use of the word “judgment” 
in this context is meant to be generic, this view does not even begin to describe accurately 
what a criminal judge’s central role is— to ensure fair and speedy proceedings at any stage 
in the case, with the emphasis between the two being squarely on “fair.” It is unclear what is 
meant by the qualifier “seen to be so”: Does it refer to making all decisions public? Does it 
mean “being acceptable/ intelligible to the readership”? Which readership— legally trained 
or lay persons? How about the recommendation of the PD, discussed below, that more use 
should be made of oral decisions ex tempore, and that judgments should refer more to the 
submissions of the parties instead of summarising them— how does that match the idea of 
writing well- reasoned and, presumably, independently intelligible judgmentss? At least the 
two judges who attended both the PD and the OR sessions should have flagged up these 
 79 Separation of Powers and the International Judiciary— A vision of institutional judicial independence in 
international law. In Culture of Judicial Independence: Conceptual Foundations and Practical Challenges. 
S. Shetreet and C. Forsyth (eds.), (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), 2011, 269.
 80 Pride and Prejudice or Sense and Sensibility? A pragmatic proposal for the recruitment of judges at the ICC and 
other international criminal courts, New Criminal Law Review 529 (2009).
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problems— which maybe they did without success. There may, however, be another expla-
nation, which is more of a soupçon, in that the form of words may be meant to steer judges 
away from judicial activism or using their legal imagination, and to ensure that they adopt 
a narrow “tools- of- the- trade,” “nuts- and- bolts” or “by- the- book” attitude, as many might 
do in national systems. If that is the real reason, the answer to the question of how this can 
be reconciled with the need to conduct research in often uncharted territories of law is not 
immediately clear.
4.1.4.2.  Judicial EfficiEncy aspEcts
This aspect is where the PD is much more detailed than the OR and displays a very spe-
cific attitude to where the alleged causes for inefficient handling of cases lie. The PD 
recommendations were broken up into three thematic sub- lists due to their length. These 
do, of course, overlap to some extent:
 • 4.1.4.2.1. General organisational measures
 • 4.1.4.2.2. Governance measures
 • 4.1.4.2.3. Procedural measures
4.1.4.2.1. General Organisational Measures
PD OR
Call upon judges, upon assignment to a case, 
to thoroughly prepare and maintain in- depth 
knowledge of the circumstances of the case, 
including by developing of common and 
pertinent methods of familiarization with and 
analysis of facts and issues in dispute;
Ensure that each procedural phase of the 
proceedings serves its own purpose and avoids 
duplication to the extent possible;
Devise, at the earliest possible opportunity 
and in consultation with the Parties, a 
realistic work plan for the pre- trial, trial and 
appellate phases, taking into account the 
specific features of each case and which may be 
modified if necessary;
Strive to reduce the duration of proceedings, 
in particular by setting deadlines for the 
disclosure of materials and the filing of written 
submissions;
Strive to reduce the time spent on the final 
deliberations as well as the time spent writing 
judgments by setting indicative deadlines;
Judges should deal with a case in an 
efficient and timely manner, avoiding any 
unnecessary delay.
Judges should give priority to the work of 
their court, ensure their availability, and 
avoid distractions from other professional 
activities.
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PD OR
Encourage the development of professional 
practices whereby Chambers Legal Officers 
start drafting, on a provisional basis and 
at the earliest opportunity, those parts of a 
draft judgment which are unlikely to undergo 
significant changes;
Promote the practice of provisional but 
continuing deliberations after the testimony 
of each witness, rather than postponing all 
deliberations until the final stage;
Continue reflecting upon the practice of totally 
or partially postponing to the deliberation 
stage the assessment of the admissibility of the 
evidence presented;
Simplify the drafting of written decisions by 
referring to the arguments developed by the 
Parties in their written submissions without 
necessarily summarizing them in the body of 
the decision;
The first PD comment regarding case familiarisation is yet another banality for any judge 
who has had sufficient practice in their home system. The recommendation is furthermore 
so vague that it remains unclear what is meant by “common and pertinent” methods of case 
familiarization. Given that most international courts do not run their proceedings on the 
basis of a finite dossier created under or submitted to judicial control at the beginning of the 
trial phase, but based on the advancement of evidence by the parties, it is also questionable 
when the familiarization process will be complete: When will the judges know the parties’ 
case theory or the totality of the evidence— especially when the defence is not under any 
enhanced duty to reveal its strategy in advance?
The advice on avoiding duplication apparently is probably meant to be understood 
against the background of problems such as how evidence taken in pre- trial is introduced 
at trial, and trial evidence treated at the appellate level. In most courts, the default approach 
is that of having live evidence at each stage where it is relevant, and not simply referring 
to previously taken statements, even if they were taken under judicial oversight. A case in 
point is the ultimately French- law- based ECCC, where the pre- trial investigations were 
conducted by two investigating judges and their investigators, with immediate access by 
the prosecution and charged persons’ counsel to the material on the case file, yet at trial the 
vast majority of the evidence was rehashed in detail by live witness testimony etc. based on 
the judicial investigation case file, although in Case 002/ 2, for example, there was a massive 
disclosure of evidence from other investigation case files not previously available in the 
case file on which the trial proceedings were based. To the extent that an appeal based on 
evidential matters is allowed, the appellate court may need to hear a witness again, or even 
hear new witnesses not previously available. Otherwise, it is unclear how different phases 
of proceedings could duplicate each other. It appears that the PD advocates greater direct 
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reliance on prior statements, documents etc. The problem with that is, however, that in 
many cases these statements will have been taken without the presence of defence counsel 
and thus can be adversarially tested for the first time only at trial. This has, for example, led 
to a reluctance in allowing such evidence to be used if it goes to the heart of the charges.81
The comment related to the establishment of a work plan, clearly inspired by manage-
rial thinking, that can be adjusted as necessary is an idea whose feasibility has been proven 
questionable in practice time and time again. Judicial proceedings are primarily focused on 
fair trial rules; speed and efficiency can only be adduced to the benefit of the defence in that 
environment; the value of victim- centred exhortations about speed has been addressed 
above. As the comment by Judge de Brichambaut cited above alone shows, the managerial 
understanding of the latter two, which seems to underlie the PD comment, is in systemic 
tension with that primary judicial task. The ECCC again, as an example in a related context, 
has had ample experience with its quarterly completion plan updates, which repeatedly had 
to extend deadlines because circumstances beyond the judges’ control impacted the course 
of proceedings, such as massive staff attrition especially in the court’s end phase, or lack of 
funding to recruit sufficient staff or pay for speedy translation etc. Adjustable work plans 
will inevitably be overtaken by events and will need to be adjusted. If there is no sanction 
for adjusting them, what is the point in having them in the first place and spending time 
lost82 on the actual judicial activities the work plan is meant to map out on their concep-
tual preparation, drafting, coordination with all parties involved, monitoring compliance, 
adjustment etc.? Effective judicial organisation of a court’s— and more to the point in this 
context: a panel’s— business is an undeniable necessity, but it is doubtful whether the pro-
posal of a case- specific work plan with the typically ensuing busy and often hectic sched-
uling and monitoring activity can do more than create and convey the illusion of judicial 
efficiency and diligence or, put in simpler terms, of the court “being busy.”
The remarks on reducing the duration of proceedings and setting deadlines for disclo-
sure and filings are related to the previous comment, subject to the same criticism, and 
equally vacuous: The idea about setting deadlines only bites if the consequence of a late 
filing or disclosure, for example, is the preclusion of the filing party’s material from consid-
eration in the proceedings, a problematic concept in any (serious) criminal case especially 
when it applies to filings by the defence which are not merely vexatious and dilatory. Will 
a court really be willing to throw out crucial evidence from either side because it was filed 
too late?83 When does “too late” begin? This proposed bar could not apply at all to the dis-
closure of exculpatory material, for which there is an ongoing duty of disclosure and con-
sideration throughout the entirety of the proceedings. Nor can it conceptually encompass 
evidence not known or available at the time the deadline elapsed.
Reducing the time spent on final deliberations and setting “indicative” deadlines for 
drafting of judgments also belongs in the category of half- hearted measures. What is the 
 81 See, for example, Rules 92bis to 92quater RPE- ICTY.
 82 In fact, as Renan Villacis has shown, the number meetings of the ASP and its committees with the at-
tendant requests for input from the ICC’s judicial and other sections had already taken its toll in the years 
from 2013 to 2017; see R. Villacis, Working Methods of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute, 
International Criminal Law Review, 563 at 570– 571 (2018).
 83 See for an example from the United States the 1988 landmark case of Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, in which 
a defence witness was excluded from testifying for reasons of vexatiousness and attorney error, and the 
academic commentary by M.R. Atkinson, Discovery Sanctions against the Criminal Defendant: Preclusion, 
Judicial Discretion and Truth- Seeking, 14 Pace Law Review 597 (1994).
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consequence if the “indicative” deadline for the judgment is breached? Does the PD en-
visage a procedure whereby the court issues a judgment ex tempore with the (full) reasons 
reserved, as happened, for example, on 16 November 2018 at the ECCC with the trial judg-
ment in Case 002/ 2?84 For any of this to produce a measurable effect, there would have to 
be a consequence attached to missing the deadline. An example for such a provision from a 
national jurisdiction the author is familiar with, Germany, is § 275(1) of the GCCP:
(1) If the judgment including reasons has not been fully incorporated in the record, it 
shall be placed on file without delay. This must be done no later than five weeks after pro-
nouncement; this time limit shall be extended by two weeks if the main hearing lasted 
longer than three days, and, if the main hearing lasted longer than ten days, by another 
two weeks for every ten days of the main hearing or part thereof. Once the time limit 
has expired the reasons for the judgment may no longer be amended. The time limit 
may be exceeded only if and so long as the court, due to a circumstance which cannot 
be anticipated or averted in the particular case, has been prevented from observing it. 
The date of receipt and any amendment of the reasons shall be noted by the registry.85
Then consequence of missing the deadline under § 275(1) is spelt out in § 338 No. 7 
GCCP, an absolute ground of appeal, i.e. typically without the possibility of arguing harm-
less error:86
A judgment shall always be considered to be based on a violation of the law . . . 
7. if the judgment contains no reasons for the decision or the reasons have not been 
placed on the file within the time limit applicable pursuant to Section 275 subsection 
(1), second and fourth sentences;87
Of interest in this context is a related provision on adjournments, § 229 GCCP:
 (1) A main hearing may be interrupted for a period of up to three weeks.
 (2) A main hearing may be interrupted for a period of up to one month if it has been 
conducted for at least ten days prior thereto.
 (3) If a defendant or a person called upon to reach a judgment is unable, due to sick-
ness, to appear at a main hearing which has already continued for at least ten days, 
the running of the time limits referred to in subsections (1) and (2) shall be sus-
pended for the duration of the incapacity, up to a maximum of six weeks; these 
time periods shall expire no earlier than ten days after the suspension has ended. 
 84 Judgment summary available online at https://www.eccc.gov.kh/ en/ document/ court/ summary- 
judgement- case- 00202- against- nuon- chea- and- khieu- samphan; the full judgment can be found at https:// 
www.eccc.gov.kh/ en/ document/ court/ case- 00202- judgement.
 85 Online at https://www.gesetze- im- internet.de/ englisch_ stpo/ englisch_ stpo.html#p1813.
 86 M. Bohlander, Principles of German Criminal Procedure (Hart Publishing, 2012), 
260 ff. (hereinafter “PGCP”); see for the details LUTZ Meyer- Goßner & BERTRAM Schmitt, 
Strafprozessordnung (61st ed., C.H. Beck, 2018), § 338 mn. 51 ff. However, note that according to 
the jurisprudence of the Federal Court of Justice, the absolute lack of reasons is typically already caught 
be the basic appeal on the merits under § 337 GCCP, i.e. the so- called Sachrüge, which does not require 
the appellant to give any reasons for the appeal other than the contention that the law has been incorrectly 
applied. See also M. Bohlander, PGCP, 273, on the remaining ambit of application of § 338 No. 7 GCCP.
 87 Online at https://www.gesetze- im- internet.de/ englisch_ stpo/ englisch_ stpo.html#p2003.
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The court shall determine the commencement and end date of the suspension in 
an incontestable ruling.
 (4) If the main hearing has not been re- continued at the latest by the day following expiry of 
the time limit referred to in the previous subsections, the main hearing shall commence 
de novo. If the day following expiry of the time limit is a Sunday, a public holiday 
or a Saturday, the main hearing may be re- continued on the next working day. 
[Emphasis added.]88
Such a strict canon of rules, which has real potential to focus judicial minds, is conspic-
uously absent from any of the legal frameworks in international courts— probably be-
cause even more than in domestic cases, the high degree of unpredictability of procedural 
developments is ever present in the minds of the drafters of statutes and rules of procedure. 
However, the irony of the situation is that applying such a rule in international courts in 
order to speed up the judicial work could very well prove counter- productive, especially 
from the donors’ point of view, because it would not only lead to a waste and duplication 
of judicial work but also of funding. At the end of the day, practical experience at national 
level tends to show that this problem is directly linked to the number of judges available to 
work on incoming cases, and the ratio of judges to cases at international tribunals is simply 
much too low, bearing in mind the complexity of the proceedings. Hence it is very unlikely 
that such a rule would be adopted at the international level, for purely pragmatic reasons.89
The recommendations about legal officers drafting sections which are unlikely to un-
dergo changes as early as possible— and deliberating on evidence on an ongoing basis— are 
fraught with problems. The parts that are unlikely to undergo changes are the procedural 
history sections which can be updated continuously, but they are on the one hand not the 
ones that cause the most work, and on the other hand, continuous drafting from an early 
stage has a tendency to lead to bloated documents which do not recount merely the essen-
tial elements, but a myriad of ultimately superfluous things. It is also telling that the drafting 
is apparently meant to be shifted to the legal support staff, away from the judges. My own 
experience as an investigating judge at the ECCC running four cases at the same time has 
somewhat sobered me in that respect compared to my previous academic stance on the 
matter,90 because the sheer mass of drafting in four cases running simultaneously over many 
years, with a plethora of motions by the parties, cannot be adequately done by one judge 
alone, unless one is prepared to accept long delays even in interlocutory proceedings. Yet, 
at the end of the day, the judge is in charge and responsible for the output; this can create 
issues if one relies too much on the work of legal officers, many of whom, brilliant as they 
may be, may not have had enough forensic experience.
The continuous deliberation approach is subject to the banality of foreseeable changes 
in evidentiary evaluation, especially in a party- driven environment of prosecution case 
followed by defence case etc. It is useful if it is the judges who are structuring the evi-
dence presentation and if there is a willingness to engage openly with the parties about the 
 88 Available at https://www.gesetze- im- internet.de/ englisch_ stpo/ englisch_ stpo.html#p1583.
 89 In fact, the issue was raised during the negotiations of the ICC Statue and based on advice from the ICTY’s 
former President, Claude Jorda, it was decided that a strict time limit should not be adopted; see P. Lewis, 
Trial Procedure, in R.S. Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court— Elements of Crimes and Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence (Transnational Publishers), 2001, 551 f.
 90 See M. Bohlander & M. Findlay, The use of domestic sources as a basis for international criminal law prin-
ciples. In [2002] The Global Community, Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence. (Oceana 
Publications), 2003, 3.
52 “ E x T E R N A L  S T A k E H O L D E R  B E N E v O L E N C E ”
52
direction the evidence is taking in the court’s view. However, from my own experience as 
a trial judge in Germany, in cases where the defence in particular is running an aggressive 
or disruptive strategy, this risks recusal motions on the grounds of the appearance that the 
court has pre- judged the evidence. As a matter of purely experiential statistics, the cases of 
a clear watershed moment in mid- trial are not as frequent as the recommendation might 
suggest.
In any event, the next idea of postponing the decision on the admissibility of evi-
dence to the latest stage possible, would appear to run counter to the recommendation 
just discussed: What is the purpose of continuous deliberation on evidence that may be 
excluded only later? Evidence tends to be interconnected, and allowing Evidence A to be 
presented on day 21 of a trial may lead to the presentation of Evidence B, C, D etc. on 
days 22– 29 under the case strategy of the parties, yet those might have been irrelevant or 
themselves been inadmissible if A had been excluded immediately. If Evidence A is then 
excluded only on day 278 of the trial, what does that do to B, C and D and more generally 
to the parties’ case strategy? If A had been excluded early on, the other party would not 
have had to respond to it, either. What the PD may have meant is to exclude interlocutory 
appeals against the admission or exclusion of pieces of evidence and to restrict attacks to 
an appeal against the final judgment. Yet, that seems to be the prevailing practice anyway.
Finally, as already briefly addressed in the previous section, referring to the filings of the 
parties without summarizing them is a step in the right direction, i.e. shorter judgments; 
however, it risks the creation of texts that are not intelligible in and of themselves without 
referring to other documents. The parties may not be disadvantaged by this, but the average 
reader will be. It is also worth noting that two judges of the ICC Appeals Chamber majority 
in Bemba criticised the Trial Chamber for making extensive use of cross- references within 
its judgment.91 How much more would this criticism apply if the reference was made to 
documents extraneous to the judgment? Moreover, one must bear in mind the difference 
between trial and appellate judgments. The former can, as in the German practice,92 simply 
state what the court considers to be the proven facts without going into any detail about the 
parties’ submissions— many of which incidentally will often have been dealt with in inter-
locutory decisions during the trial— but an appellate court must at least summarize the 
grounds of appeal.
Turning to the OR, the first recommendation is another banality not worth discussing 
any further after what was already said above. The second one related to outside activi-
ties preventing full commitment to the judicial responsibilities should also be understood; 
however, there are issues that may make this difficult. Take the KSC, for example, where 
all judges except the President are merely on a roster and assigned to cases only once a 
need arises. They have other occupations with which they earn their livelihood, they have 
responsibilities to their employers, in the case of academics also to their students and/ or 
long- term funded research or publication projects, and finally in the case of private counsel, 
to their clients under pain of liability for malpractice. Not everyone can just stop what they 
are doing at the drop of a hat and go sit on a trial lasting maybe two years; there will be some 
unavoidable friction loss due to the need to accommodate other commitments. Moreover, 
it is a well- known phenomenon that judges at appellate courts in particular— much like 
 91 Prosecutor v. Jean- Pierre Bemba Gombo, Judgement, Case No. ICC- 01/ 05- 01/ 08 A, 8 June 2018— joint 
separate opinion by Judges Van den Wyngaert and Morrison at ICC- 01/ 05- 01/ 08- 3636- Anx2, paras. 
7– 10, 64.
 92 See M. Bohlander, PGCP, 128 ff., 290 ff.
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experienced counsel and prosecutors— are sought- after authors for legal commentaries 
and manuals. This is in principle unobjectionable as long as the work does not suffer; in 
fact, the published experience of such judges can be essential for keeping the interpretation 
of the law within the limits of practical relevance and usefulness.
4.1.4.2.2. Governance Measures
PD OR
Encourage Presiding Judges, in addition to their 
purely judicial activities, to fulfil their managerial 
role in preparation of any hearing and in the 
conduct of proceedings;
Support the implementation of provisions 
entrusting the pre- trial and pre- appeal case 
management to a Single Judge, with the obligation 
for the latter to discuss with and report regularly to 
the other Judges composing the Chamber;
Develop technical tools tailored to the mandate 
of each court or tribunal that can facilitate and 
optimize the conduct of proceedings;
Develop regularly updated databases of 
jurisprudence;
Encourage standardized collection of statistical data 
between international criminal courts and tribunals 
to identify possible common challenges and foster 
the dissemination of best practices;
Reflect on the identification of indicators aimed 
at optimizing the work of international criminal 
courts and tribunals and making it more 
transparent, in order to benefit from qualitative 
information capable of enhancing procedures and 
practices;
Ensure that audit teams are staffed with 
professionals who possess in- depth knowledge and 
expertise relating to the operation of the organs 
of international courts and tribunals and their 
work, and reflect upon the creation of a common 
international audit body;
The efficient and cost- effective use of 
technology should be encouraged.
Courts should create searchable 
databases of their jurisprudence for 
reference by other courts and the 
public.
This category contains some of the more generic second- order criteria of governance, some 
of which are fleshed out in more detail in the next section, with some appearing in multiple 
sections due to different areas of impact.
The meaning of the first PD point about encouraging presiding judges to fulfil their 
managerial role in addition to their judicial activity in preparing hearings and the conduct 
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of proceedings is unclear: They are one and the same. A presiding judge exercises only ju-
dicial activities when a specific case is concerned, as opposed to general organisational 
matters, such as, for example, selecting chamber support staff, authorising requests for of-
fice supplies93 or making contributions to the chambers’ budget plans etc. That a chamber’s 
presiding judge’s primary role, as opposed to that of a reporting judge (juge rapporteur/ 
Berichterstatter) whose task is to focus on the substance of the case, is the overall manage-
ment of an individual proceeding and any hearing is obvious. Is the PD trying to say that at 
present not all presiding judges live up to that expectation? What does the PD mean when 
it talks about “the presiding judge”: The judge who has been elected as the presiding judge 
of a chamber in general, or the presiding judge in a particular case, which is not always one 
and the same thing and happens in many international criminal courts? Should the two 
ever be separated? Running a (complex) trial requires experience and building up a routine. 
That becomes more difficult if, as it were, everyone gets a shot at presiding on the basis of 
a rotation system.
In a sense, the first recommendation directly conflicts with the next one of entrusting 
the pre- trial and pre- appeal proceedings to a single judge, who has to consult regularly with 
the rest of the chamber. In such a scenario, what is the (residual?) function of the presiding 
judge as just outlined above? Again, drawing on my own experience from having been on 
a three- judge collegiate panel in a domestic system, the presiding judge did all that work 
in every case, in consultation with the reporting judge or the full chamber, as the case re-
quired. Given the much higher case load and much tighter turnaround times in domestic 
courts, surely the few cases on the docket of any panel in international criminal courts could 
be handled in the same manner?
The effective use of technology is addressed by both the PD and OR. From my expe-
rience as a legal officer at the ICTY in 1999– 2001, a judge in a domestic system and later 
at the ECCC and KSC, this has been happening for years and progressively so. It is unclear 
what particular grievance both the PD and OR are trying to remedy here. Is it that too many 
judges still do not use IT themselves, write their drafts by hand or dictate them— if they 
engage in primary drafting of any kind at all (see above)? I see no evidence of that being a 
major issue. Or is it an encouragement to move to a paperless file— again something that is 
more or less already standard practice? If it is the latter, then some judges might legitimately 
raise occupational health reservations based on risk to their eyesight through overexposure 
to computer monitors, for example. With all due respect for age equality concerns, some 
of the older judges, who based on previous experience of judicial selection may be in their 
70s or even 80s, may also find it more difficult to engage with IT beyond mere word pro-
cessing software than their younger colleagues in their 50s and 60s, leave alone their legal 
support staff.
The creation and maintenance of judicial databases mentioned by both PD and OR is 
a necessary tool to achieve consistency in the case law, yet again in most courts that has 
been happening for some time, albeit with differing degrees of sophistication. I see no re-
sistance to the concept other than potential financing or logistical problems. In that con-
text, since the advent of the rapidly improving ICC Legal Tools database, it might also be 
an idea not to duplicate efforts at each court but to cooperate, at least as far as criminal 
tribunals are concerned, with the ICC in expanding its database as a kind of central re-
pository to cover decisions by other courts, to the extent that these are public record, and 
 93 This is not meant to be specious: I had to do that for my office at the ECCC.
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retain a confidential database at each court as needed for decisions that cannot be shared 
publicly.
The collection of data across courts in order to promote best practices is in prin-
ciple not objectionable as long as judicial independence is fully respected, and as far as 
the publication of regular reports by each court are concerned, it is already happening to 
some extent— not to forget informal events such as those preceding the PD and OR. The 
problem lies more in the standardization aspect. On which basis are those standards to 
be determined if the procedural rules of the courts do not fully align, as is the case with 
almost all current tribunals? Looking at, for example, pre- trial prosecutorial performance 
in the ICTY and other courts based on that model, and comparing it with the prosecution 
role, for example, in the ICC pre- trial environment, or in its interplay with the pre- trial 
judge of the STL or the investigating judges of the ECCC, one is quickly in danger of either 
comparing apples and oranges or of adopting levels of abstraction that make practically 
useful findings unlikely.
The PD’s recommendation of identifying cross- institutional key performance indicators 
(KPI) to optimize and enhance the procedure and practice is the lynchpin of the target- 
based, managerial mindset driving a good part of the exercise in my view. I have already 
alluded to my principled opposition to this idea above, and refer for more detail to the 
ECCC’s co- investigating judges’ 2017 joint decision on budgetary impact on fair trial rules, 
where my colleague and I held as follows:
Use of results- based budgeting (RBB)
We [.  .  .] consider an application of RBB or “milestones” as a measure of success 
and/ or progress to judicial decision- making processes incompatible with judicial 
independence in decision- making [. . .]
It is worth noting in this context the ICC’s recent efforts at developing its own 
performance indicators, which are a telling example of the difficulties a court faces 
when trying to reconcile managerialist demands around effectiveness and efficiency 
from the donor community with those arising out of fair trial principles [. . .]
Discussions regarding their interplay in the past have highlighted the
[.  .  .] question of viability of performance indicators for an international criminal 
court and the need to preserve judicial and prosecutorial independence while 
striving for an optimal organisational performance. It was also emphasized that the 
ICC’s performance depends in many respects on the support and cooperation that 
it receives from the global community.
The [ICC] explicitly recognises the complexity of indicator selection particularly in 
relation to the fairness of the proceedings which can be very difficult to measure The 
[ICC] notes that the goal of fairness potentially conflicts with that of expeditiousness, 
evidencing the difficulties of qualitatively measuring the performance of a judicial 
institution.
The [ICC] wisely acknowledges that the speed of proceedings will be constrained 
by the time and participation that must be afforded to the parties in accordance with the 
needs for procedural fairness and to establish the truth and that in
[ ] practice what appears to be mostly used to measure fairness at the national level 
are workload indicators on defence issues that could point towards a level of fairness 
of proceedings such as time spent addressing concerns raised by the defence time 
given to defence in making their case etc.
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The [ICC] warns against equating duration and speed of cases with efficiency, noting 
that care must be taken to balance speed with fairness, [and] against benchmarking 
across cases stating
[E] ach case has its unique features and benchmarking from one case to another 
will therefore not be possible strictu sensu The duration of each case is affected by a 
number of case- specific factors such as the number of accused persons, the number 
and nature of the charges the volume of evidence and likely number of witnesses 
and the geographical scope of the case localised or extensive cooperation of States 
in providing needed assistance and the speed with which such assistance is pro-
vided These and any other relevant factors taken together may contribute to assess 
the relative complexity of a case which is likely to affect its overall duration In prin-
ciple the more complex and voluminous a case the longer its duration.
The same considerations apply mutatis mutandis to the proceedings before the ECCC 
The [.  .  .] findings strengthen us in our view that despite the executive driven trend 
in that direction applying managerial criteria to the core judicial activity is either 
bound to end as an exercise in futility or risks making dangerous inroads to the judicial 
self- perception.94
Apart from these principled objections, the same criticism as the one described above with 
regard to attempts at standardized data exchange applies. Regrettably, none of this seems to 
stop the advance of this kind of thinking even among judges, domestic or international, who 
are increasingly at risk of falling into the trap of externally induced self- regulation by mo-
tivational alignment with the criteria espoused and propounded by extraneous actors who 
may be subscribing to advancing a wholly different societal meta- agenda, such as, for ex-
ample, subjecting every aspect of society to a managerial, cost- benefit or target- driven and 
ultimately commercialised approach of full behavioural control, where the system provides 
as much justice as it can— or wants to?— afford and judges have to compromise on their 
compliance with the demands of the rule of law, for which countless people suffered and 
died over centuries, but which are no longer deemed sufficiently relevant from the meta- 
agents’ point of view. Shoshana Zuboff has recently described the emerging phenomenon 
of “surveillance capitalism,” which is a striking example of such a deleterious and clandes-
tine meta- agenda.95
The final recommendation on “audit teams” and creating a common international audit 
body staffed by people experienced in court administration would appear to be related to 
the previous one on establishing KPI. There already is such a body at least as far as all UN- 
related courts and tribunals are concerned, i.e. the ACABQ. As the example from the expe-
rience with that body at the ECCC cited above shows, there is— even over 25 years since 
the creation of the ICTY— still reason to seriously doubt that any such expertise in the 
operation of judicial entities beyond mere budgetary concerns has been accumulated into 
a permanent institutional memory, or is observed beyond mere formulaic lip- service. It 
is also highly questionable whether other international organisations supporting interna-
tional courts such as the CJEU, GCEU, ECtHR, IACtHR, KSC etc. would be willing or 
even constitutionally able to submit to such an all- encompassing oversight of their own 
financial operations.
 94 See supra note 16, paras. 35– 43 (footnotes omitted).
 95 Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of 
Power (Public Affairs, New York, 2019).




Encourage the Parties, and particularly the Prosecutor, 
to ensure that documents and supporting materials are 
disclosed or submitted in a manner that facilitates their 
consideration and analysis;
Encourage Presiding Judges, Pre- Trial Judges and Pre- 
Appeal Judges to play an active role prior to the opening of 
the case and during the course of the proceedings, in close 
consultation with the Parties, to continuously determine the 
number of witnesses to be heard, the modalities of hearings, 
and the time required for the presentation of evidence;
Encourage Pre- Trial Judges to determine all preliminary and 
interlocutory issues raised at that stage unless the issue is one 
which ought plainly to be left for determination by the Trial 
Chamber;
Encourage, where appropriate, the use of procedures which 
allow for the presentation of witness evidence or portions 
of such evidence in written form, with the opportunity to 
examine and cross- examine the witness if required;
Encourage the use of oral decisions to rule on applications, as 
appropriate;
Consider more streamlined cross- examination procedures 
that are better suited to individual witnesses, consistent with 
the rights of the Parties;
Recommend to the Parties, wherever possible, to make use of 
procedures for recording points of agreements on matters of 
law and fact and to favour the taking of judicial notice of facts 
of common knowledge;
Consider the use of innovative measures to allow for the 
gathering of evidence under judicial supervision at the pre- 
trial stage, including expanded use of provisions such as the 
unique investigative opportunities regime;
N/ A
As mentioned in the previous section, there is some overlap with the criteria in this section, 
and the choice to put the above recommendations under this heading is to some extent 
arbitrary, yet based on a subjective perception of their comparative degree of specificity. 
Again, quite a number of the recommendations are nothing out of the ordinary as far as 
good judicial practice is concerned, but nonetheless the way in which they are presented 
can raise concerns in the international context.
Encouraging in particular the prosecution to disclose relevant materials in a manner 
“that facilitates their consideration and analysis” is a desire that has been expressed for many 
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years, and the phenomenon of the prosecution “burying” the defence in CD- ROMs with 
millions of pages has not been forgotten. The extent to which the disclosure obligations are 
honoured still very much depends on the ethical disposition of the prosecutor in charge 
of a case. I profess a clear preference for the way this was handled at the ECCC, where the 
defence had access to the full confidential case file as created by the co- investigating judges, 
and as soon as the suspect had been formally charged. Exceptions were rare, such as records 
of disagreements between the judges, material which fell under the internal work product 
rule, or evidentiary leads that needed to be exhausted and were protected until any danger of 
tampering had passed. What was not on the case file at the time of the closing order96 could 
not be used at trial by any party, unless it was not available at the time or— as happened fre-
quently in case 002/ 2— material from another case file relevant to the charges in the trial 
but not yet available at the start of the trial had to be transferred to the current proceedings, 
mainly via cross- case disclosure requests by the prosecution who, of course and unlike the 
defence or victims, enjoyed the benefit of having access to all case files. The earlier judicial 
control over the evidence sets in, the fewer problems will arise in this context.
There is a certain overlap with the previous sections when it comes to the recommen-
dation encouraging presiding, pre- trial and pre- appeal judges to play an active part in the 
proceedings in close consultation with the parties, to “continuously determine the number 
of witnesses to be heard, the modalities of hearings, and the time required for the presen-
tation of evidence.” As I have said elsewhere,97 I would much prefer if the judges took it 
upon themselves to structure the hearings and call the evidence themselves, to get rid of 
the adversarial approach of prosecution and defence case, based on a finite— and ideally 
final— dossier prepared by the prosecution or a pre- trial judge in advance of the trial; only 
then will they have full control over the time and resource issue and avoid making possibly 
ill- informed rulings on how much time a witness can spend on the stand. No judge worth 
their salt will cut off a crucial witness in mid- testimony simply because they overran, and 
the same applies to deducting any “overtime” from the overall time budget available for 
a party to call its witnesses. These things do not lend themselves to micro- managing and 
target- based scheduling.
Having the pre- trial judge(s) determine all pre- trial and interlocutory issues at that 
stage is, one would have thought, a natural function of that office; in essence this recom-
mendation is only a subset of the earlier ones on the extensive use of pre- trial or pre- appeal 
judges. However, the question of what needs to be submitted to the full chamber requires 
a properly circumscribed mechanism, it cannot be left to the free discretion of the single 
judge. This can either be done by, for example, enumerating reserved topics in the law, or by 
allowing the parties to ask for a re- hearing en banc.
The extended use of written forms of evidence, including witness statements, and the 
concomitant concerns have already been addressed above. The qualifier of having the wit-
ness available for direct or cross- examination “as required” is very likely an expression of 
the unease that even the signatories of the PD had with the idea, and follows established 
international practice. So the question is: Why yet another exhortation to do the obvious?
The extended use of oral rulings, issued directly from the bench on the trial record, has 
often been advocated but rarely, if ever, been properly implemented. Apart from the fact 
that sometimes the issues are too complex to do this in a sufficient number of cases, my per-
sonal impression is that not few international judges are uncomfortable with making such 
ex tempore rulings on the record because many (still) do not have sufficient prior judicial 
 96 Or possibly added by the PTC during the appellate stage.
 97 See supra note 12.
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experience in (international) criminal procedure, in particular for dealing with, for example, 
evidentiary objections beyond the most basic categories. To make this recommendation 
work would require intensive pre- deployment training in the trial advocacy rules applicable 
before the court to which a judge is being sent, something which after over 25 years of the 
“new generation” of international tribunals is still not happening.
The comment on more streamlined and “customized” cross- examination procedure 
consistent with the rights of the parties is entirely unclear. What does “better suited to in-
dividual witnesses” mean? The court can already control and restrict excessive or abusive 
cross- examination practices. Protections for vulnerable witnesses exist. As mentioned at 
the beginning, this is another example why one would have wished for some greater detail 
or a kind of commentary/ explanatory note on the meaning of particular recommendations.
In the same vein, the increased use— with the consent of the parties— of agreed facts 
or even points of law, as well as taking judicial notice seems prima facie sensible, but is not 
without concerns. The previous episode at the ICTY around agreed facts in Brdjanin98 
alone is testament to the potential for mischief and the defence in particular will often not 
be in any hurry to make the court’s work any easier. To ask the parties to agree on the law 
is a dereliction of duty by the judges— iura novit curia. An agreement on the law can in 
any event never be binding on the court, even if the judges give it their seal of approval, 
when the judges’ views change ex post facto; the experience of the uncertainties created by 
instruments such as preliminary motions and decisions on the applicable law as attempted 
at the STL99 also militates against the extensive use of such procedural devices. Finally, judi-
cial notice of facts of common knowledge is not the real problem— that category is mostly 
restricted to proven and generally accepted facts of science; it becomes already problematic 
when it is meant to stretch to historical facts, as exemplified by the sporadic recurrence of 
free speech litigation over the details or even the occurrence of the Holocaust under the 
Nazi regime. The real time- saver would be cross- case and possibly even cross- panel judicial 
notice of previously adjudicated facts; however, that category is highly controversial and 
the very fact that a judge has previously ruled on facts identical to a second case is often the 
basis of recusal motions (see above with regard to the Antonetti/ Meron dispute); neither 
the PD nor the OR ask for its use— rightly so. In any event, in many cases the use of judicial 
notice could itself be subjected to (possibly interlocutory?) litigation, negating any time 
savings intended to be gained by the use of the procedure.
Lastly, the extended use of innovative measures for pre- trial evidence gathering under 
judicial supervision, especially the expanded use of the unique investigative opportunity 
regime, is also somewhat nebulous and could have done with some explanation. Having 
served as an investigating judge à la française in an internationalised court, I  am unsure 
whether such a regime is what the PD had in mind: It is pre- trial evidence gathering under 
judicial supervision— but what would be innovative about it? The unique investigative op-
portunity regime mentioned here is probably the one already found in Art. 56 of the ICC 
Statute, i.e. “a unique opportunity to take testimony or a statement from a witness or to 
examine, collect or test evidence, which may not be available subsequently for the purposes of a 
trial” [Emphasis added]. Art. 56 also establishes certain safeguards for the defence. The ap-
plication of this regime is conceptually driven by the qualifier of the risk that the evidence 
my not be available at trial. Those cases will not be legion— what would be the suggested 
grounds for the “innovative” expansion of its application, if the judicial supervision criterion 
 98 See supra note 12.
 99 Nullum crimen sine poena— Zur Unberechenbarkeit völkerstrafrechtlicher Lehrenbildung. In Heiner Alwart 
et al. (eds), Freiheitsverluste in Recht, Rechtsregime und Gesellschaft (Mohr Siebeck), 2014, 45.
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is still meant to apply to it generically? If the witness is after all and unexpectedly available at 
trial, it would be questionable not to call them or have them at least standing by for giving 
live evidence, unless the parties agree and the court is satisfied of the reliability of the pre-
vious record so taken.
4.1.4.3.  Judicial transparEncy aspEcts
On this topic, the OR put a much greater emphasis. Clearly, the drafters see the need to provide 
as much easily accessible information as possible as crucial both for their legacy to the public 
and for the donor community.
PD OR
Develop regularly updated 
databases of jurisprudence;
Hearings should, in principle, be open and accessible to the 
public and livestreamed for remote viewing.
Subject to the specific character of the institution, there 
may be need for some part or all of proceedings to 
remain confidential. Judicial deliberations should remain 
confidential.
video footage should be archived and made available online 
to the extent possible.
Judgments and other judicial decisions, normative 
institutional documents such as rules of procedure, 
submissions by parties, and evidentiary materials 
(depending on the specificity of the institution) should 
be easily accessible to the public via the court’s website or 
archived elsewhere.
Courts should create searchable databases of their 
jurisprudence for reference by other courts and the public.
Both the PD and OR emphasise the creation of regularly updated and searchable databases, 
with the OR stressing the public access aspect as well, which will be of particular use for aca-
demic and governmental research. Otherwise, this point has been addressed above.
The OR re- state the well- known open justice rule, augmented by a live- streaming option. 
Given that so- called “Courtroom TV” has been gaining ground domestically for some years, 
but especially so in international proceedings, this also merely re- states current practice. The 
same applies to the third OR point on archived video footage.
Since 25 April 2018, however, the additional question has arisen of whether interna-
tional courts and tribunals operating in the territory of the EU or using data of EU nationals 
will be bound by the 2016 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),100 because it also 
applies in principle to public authorities and international organisations (see Nos. 101 ff 
of the Preliminaries, Art. 4(7)– (10), (26) GDPR), with no express exception being made 
 100 Regulation (EU) 2016/ 679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the pro-
tection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, and repealing Directive 95/ 46/ EC (General Data Protection Regulation).
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regarding internationally established courts etc., except for data processing etc. necessary 
when acting in a judicial task.101 While the situation may be relatively straightforward with 
regard to the accused, it becomes less clear when witnesses or even the general public in 
the public gallery are concerned (compare Arts. 6(1)(e), 9(f), 23 GDPR):  Is streaming 
or archiving their pictures necessary for the performance of the judicial task? Is the video- 
recording an act of a court acting in a judicial task? What about the defendant’s right to rec-
tification and erasure under Arts. 16 and 17 GDPR in case of an acquittal? ICC legal expert 
Philipp Ambach expressed the view that, for example, “for ICC cooperation requests to EU 
member states, as noted in art. 99(1) [of the Rome Statute], these states could be held to 
comply with the Regulation as ‘relevant procedure under the law of the requested State’ in 
their response to the ICC. This could create a conflict— one that could be encompassed 
by the consultation provision in art. 97 [of the Rome Statute] (the second sentence is 
non- exhaustive).”102
These concerns apply equally to the fourth recommendation regarding the archiving of 
evidence and submissions.
Full transparency will nonetheless still have to be subject to any protective measures 
or closed sessions, as is indicated by the OR in the second point. However, it is striking 
that the OR use the word “should” instead of “shall,” when it comes to the secrecy of judi-
cial deliberations. Except for the context of separate or dissenting opinions, the secrecy of 
deliberations is typically inviolable.
 101 See, e.g., Nos. 101 and 102 of the Preliminaries:
(101) Flows of personal data to and from countries outside the Union and international organisations 
are necessary for the expansion of international trade and international cooperation. The increase in 
such flows has raised new challenges and concerns with regard to the protection of personal data. 
However, when personal data are transferred from the Union to controllers, processors or other 
recipients in third countries or to international organisations, the level of protection of natural persons 
ensured in the Union by this Regulation should not be undermined, including in cases of onward 
transfers of personal data from the third country or international organisation to controllers, processors 
in the same or another third country or international organisation. In any event, transfers to third coun-
tries and international organisations may only be carried out in full compliance with this Regulation. 
A transfer could take place only if, subject to the other provisions of this Regulation, the conditions laid 
down in the provisions of this Regulation relating to the transfer of personal data to third countries or 
international organisations are complied with by the controller or processor.
(102) This Regulation is without prejudice to international agreements concluded between the Union 
and third countries regulating the transfer of personal data including appropriate safeguards for the 
data subjects. Member States may conclude international agreements which involve the transfer of personal 
data to third countries or international organisations, as far as such agreements do not affect this Regulation 
or any other provisions of Union law and include an appropriate level of protection for the fundamental 
rights of the data subjects. [Emphasis added.]
 102 Email from Dr Philipp Ambach of 24 January 2019— on file with the author.
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4.1.4.4.  Judicial public rElations aspEcts
PD OR
Develop regularly updated 
databases of jurisprudence;
In view of the complex and shifting global context, courts 
must increasingly pay attention to communicating their 
decisions, tasks and responsibilities.
Court Presidents should assume primary responsibility, their 
caseload and other duties permitting, for interacting with 
states parties and relevant organizations.
Judges should endeavor to promote the tasks and functioning 
of their court by explaining its work to the public— including 
visitors, students, and practitioners— as appropriate.
International courts, assisted by departments responsible for 
communication and outreach, should coordinate the outreach 
activities of their members and offices to ensure correct and 
consistent messaging to their various constituencies.
Again, the PD only engages with this topic by way of the database recommendation. The 
first OR recommendation is unobjectionable but also nothing novel, given that each inter-
national court has some form of public affairs and/ or outreach section, also addressed in 
the fourth recommendation. In the age of the internet and ubiquitous smart phones and 
tablets, automated emailing lists or RSS notifications, this aspect seems to be well taken 
care of.
The second point regarding the primary responsibility of the Presidents is also taken and 
again, seems to be the current practice anyway, applying equally to the Chief Prosecutors 
for their area of responsibility but not mentioned by the OR.
As far as judges are meant to engage in promoting and explaining the work of their 
courts to the public, I have some reservations based on the impact on their position and 
work load: Firstly, such activities may require frequent and long- distance travel, media or 
speaking engagements, or conference attendance, taking time away from them that could be 
put to better use in advancing the actual proceedings. Secondly, and speaking from my own 
experience, engaging as a judge with the public— and in particular the media— will quickly 
and inevitably lead to questions about ongoing cases, something on which judges should, 
of course, never allow themselves to be drawn.103 If judicial engagement is seen as necessary, 
one might consider appointing one judge104 as the overall spokesperson for the court— 
something not uncommon in some domestic courts— and granting them an adequate 
 103 The ECCC, for example, had its own examples in Case 002 of where judicial contacts outside the 
confines of the proceedings proper can lead. This concerned especially Judge Silvia Cartwright of the 
Trial Chamber— the several instances when she was recused can be found by typing “Cartwright 
disqualifications” into the “Search” field on the front page at https://www.eccc.gov.kh/ en.
 104 The same applies for the prosecution, of course.
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workload allocation105 for this task, while making sure that run- of- the- mill announcements 
are handled by experienced public affairs staff.
4.1.4.5.  Judicial rEcruitmEnt
Only the OR contain a section on judicial recruitment:
The process of nomination and selection of judges for international courts should re-
spect the relevant rules of the institution and be open and transparent.
As a matter of principle, it is desirable that for every regular judicial vacancy there 
be a plurality of candidates.
Nominators should bring forward candidates who demonstrate the necessary com-
petence and expertise and are clearly fit to perform their judicial duties. Institutions 
may consider establishing a maximum age limit for candidates to ensure the fitness of 
selected judges into the future.
Nominators and selectors should give consideration to the diverse composition of 
international benches, including diversity by gender.
The nomination and selection authorities should ensure that judges may work inde-
pendently and in security.
The first recommendation mostly re- states the obvious; it is unclear whether the last part 
of the sentence is intended to require a higher degree of transparency than currently prac-
ticed, possibly confirmation hearings like in the United States etc. The second recommen-
dation would again seem to reproduce what should be seen as common sense, yet given 
the opaque initial stages of proposals for judicial candidates between nominators and the 
recipient of the proposals in the relevant organisation, it is currently difficult to see whether 
and when a pre- selection occurs, or whether more than one person even applied.
The third point about candidates having the necessary competence and fitness for duty, 
the latter especially with regard to their age, is something I have extensively written on else-
where106 and with which I wholeheartedly agree. Point four on diversity is equally taken, and 
especially as far as gender diversity is concerned, work clearly remains to be done. I com-
mend, however, the approach taken by the ICC’s Advisory Committee on Nominations 
(ACN) which considers the expertise of any candidate first, before proceeding to scrutinise 
those applicants who surpass that hurdle under the different diversity criteria.107
The meaning of the last comment is very unclear: How can the nomination and selec-
tion authorities, rather than the authorities in control at the judges’ duty station, ensure 
that judges can work “independently and in security”— is that meant to refer to security of 
tenure, adequate remuneration and judicial independence, and maybe freedom from out-
side political interference etc.? If so, that would be nothing new, either. Again, one would 
have wished for even a few words of explanation and background.
 105 While this can relatively easily be accommodated in larger domestic courts, the small number of judges at 
any of the international courts means a proportionately bigger impact on available court time.
 106 See the references at Bohlander, Art. 36 mn. 3– 9, in The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court— A Commentary, 3rd ed. (Triffterer & Ambos eds., CH Beck/ Hart/ NOMOS, 2016).
 107 See Bohlander, ibid., mn. 10.
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5.  CONCLUSION
Among the reasons for the perceived lack of independence of courts and judges, the 
interference or pressure from government and politicians was the most stated 
reason, followed by the pressure from economic or other specific interests.
The 2018 EU Justice Scoreboard108
If “justice delayed is justice denied,” then equally, “justice rushed is justice crushed.”109
Indeed, my first spontaneous working title for this article was “Act in Haste— Repent at 
Leisure.” Both the PD and OR seem to proceed from a managerial point of departure, and 
their professed aim of appeasing the international donor community and countering per-
vasive donor fatigue leaves little room for any conclusion but the one that the main drive of 
both declarations is to create the impression that a “coalition of the willing” is prepared to 
exhort other judges to “get with the programme,” as it were.
I have tried to explain in this article that both the PD and OR are questionable 
documents:
 • They lack official or even peer legitimacy but have the potential for causing peer pres-
sure among the judicial community,
 • they— especially the PD— are in places adopting a somewhat condescending, not to 
say “preachy,” tone about the lack of judicial qualities that other judges seem to have,
 • they are in many instances vexingly vague without giving the reader any aid to their 
intended interpretation, or
 • they are merely re- stating the obvious, giving rise to the question of what added value 
they represent;
 • in a number of cases, they display clear potential for creating substantial problems in 
the context of fair trial and judicial independence.
This applies across all areas that have been interrogated. In my opinion, the PD and OR are 
ultimately and at best futile attempts at making the donors think that the international ju-
diciary has reached the necessary degree of problem awareness and that the donors should 
now trust them to have their financial interests at heart and to speed up the process as much 
as they can. They are more likely to give the donors unintended but welcome ammunition 
for future budget negotiations, because now the donors can point to these examples of ju-
dicial self- criticism and hold the judges to their words. At worst, they are a real- life vindi-
cation of Foucauldian analysis in that the signatories of the PD and OR have intentionally, 
knowingly and fully subscribed to a managerial and neo- liberal judicial mindset, and hold 
the resource requirements on a par with fair trial guarantees and judicial independence.
The reason for this development can in many cases be traced back to a vicious circle 
and the absence of lessons learnt: The establishment of courts with jurisdiction over war 
crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide may often have proceeded on the basis of what 
Jeremy Rabkin has called a certain “giddy, frivolous atmosphere”110 of the moment, driven 
 108 COM (2018) 364 final, 52— Emphasis in the original.
 109 The second phrase is not as common as the first, but has been used by others on previous occasions, see, 
e.g., the media reports at https:// tribune.com.pk/ story/ 677852/ future- of- law- justice- rushed- is- justice- 
crushed/ ; http:// thebirminghampress.com/ 2013/ 11/ justice- rushed- is- justice- crushed/ .
 110 Jeremy Rabkin, Global Criminal Justice: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, Cornell International Law 
Journal 753 at 777 (2005).
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by the understandable impulse to ensure there is no longer any impunity for such atrocities. 
However, often the period of establishment was coupled with (unspoken) expectations or 
promises of quick solutions and Nuremberg- like time frames which were at best illusionary 
to begin with for anyone with some experience in preparing and running complex criminal 
investigations and trials. The enthusiasm of each beginning soon and invariably gives way to 
donor fatigue, leading to fewer funds and short- term contracts, which in turn lead to more 
delays through staff attrition and general logistical strictures. This is nothing new and the 
consequences had already been experienced drastically once the completion strategy of the 
ICTY and ICTR was implemented in earnest. The right lessons have, however, not been 
learnt, it would seem.
How, for example, were the co- investigating judges at the ECCC with their staff budget 
supposed to adequately investigate massive atrocities from almost 40  years ago, leading 
to millions of victims, with evidence and especially thousands of witnesses spread across 
the entire country and abroad, with varyingly difficult conditions of access throughout the 
year due to the rainy season and the rice harvest periods when many witnesses were un-
willing to speak to investigators because they had to ensure their livelihood? They were 
difficult to track down to begin with in the absence of a proper residence register, with 
only a small contingent of experienced investigators, even bearing in mind the generous 
support from Canada which seconded a number of investigators to our office. The staff con-
tingent of the ECCC’s Office of the Co- Investigating Judges would have been dwarfed by 
any domestic police task force assigned to a high- profile single murder or terrorist attack. 
My direct predecessor had thus considered it necessary to initiate the practice of having 
appropriate legal officers and even legal consultants accredited and sworn in as (deputy) 
investigators, in order to increase the number of persons who could conduct interviews, but 
of course the time they prepared, conducted and processed witness interviews was lost for 
working on the legal aspects of each case, not to mention that not all of them had previously 
conducted interviews. Almost half the staff in my office at any given time soon after I took 
over consisted of interns, some of whom did not even have their law degrees yet.
International criminal proceedings are almost invariably situated in the category of 
complex litigation, which even in domestic settings can take years to complete.111 They 
are additionally hamstrung by the fact that there are almost always problems of state co-
operation and political tensions underlying the crimes investigated and/ or prosecuted, 
coupled with the quandary of whether it is better to move on instead of raking over the 
horrors of the past— “no peace without justice” or “no justice without peace.” They require 
resources for funding categories that are largely unknown in domestic jurisdictions even 
when dealing with complex cases. In a word, international criminal justice is expensive by 
design and nature. Unless the international community is willing to put the necessary funds 
forward, possibly by each country deciding to buy just one modern attack fighter plane,112 
helicopter113 or even one battle tank114 less in every alternate defence budget cycle, and 
 111 See e.g. the recent so- called “NSU (Nationalsozialisticher Untergrund) trial” in Germany, at http:// 
www.spiegel.de/ international/ germany/ neo- nazi- terror- trial- fails- to- answer- all- questions- a- 1218727.
html; http:// www.tellerreport.com/ life/ - - judgment- in- the- nsu- trial- - zsch%C3%A4pes- life- in- the- cell- . 
Hk1s8ZBXQ.html; and references to the related case law at https:// dejure.org/ 2018,19114.
 112 See https://www.defensenews.com/ air/ 2018/ 09/ 28/ f- 35- price- falls- before- 90m- for- first- time- ever- in- 
new- deal/ .
 113 See https:// militarymachine.com/ most- expensive- military- helicopters/ .
 114 See https://www.quora.com/ How- much- does- a- common- battle- tank- cost.
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instead channelling that money to international courts, then international criminal justice 
is not worth having. The UN itself acknowledged the underlying problems in 2012 in the 
Secretary- General’s report Delivering justice: programme of action to strengthen the rule of law 
at the national and international levels,115 which states:
International adjudicative bodies themselves are often underresourced [sic!] and do 
not have the necessary political support, especially in view of their lack of enforcement 
mechanisms. Accordingly, the non- implementation of decisions of such bodies is an 
enduring problem. In this connection:
 (a) Member States should resolve to provide international adjudicative bodies with 
sufficient resources for them to deal with their caseloads efficiently; [. . .].116
Indeed, based on the status quo of the international community’s willingness to put its 
money where its mouth is, some might say that it would be better if international criminal 
justice died and the charade came to an end.
I for one would prefer for it to be given a second, and much stronger, lease on life. 
I would like to see every country of the world submit to the power of law, not the law of 
power. I  would wish for the major global actors and others who have, for example, not 
found it necessary to accept the jurisdiction of the ICC for purely power- political reasons,
 • to realise that selective justice leaves a sour taste in the mouths of those who have 
been selected to be judged— regardless of whether rightly or wrongly— by those who 
will never allow themselves to be judged; and
 • to understand that the current complementarity regime of the ICC as the prime can-
didate and model for a real “world criminal court” is de facto rigged in favour of es-
tablished states because their jurisdictions are under a lesser systemic risk of being 
considered unable or unwilling than those in post- conflict or less developed coun-
tries, and because a credible domestic investigation or prosecution is not required to 
end in a trial, let alone a conviction.
That seems a lot, maybe too much, to wish for in an age of resurgent nationalism, protec-
tionism and populism, when executive power increasingly trumps legal process, when un-
manned drone strikes have the appeal of swift and decisive action, something which Lady 
Justice cannot deliver equally fast or in real time. However, that is no reason to take away her 
scales and replace them with a balance sheet, leaving her only the sword.
A judicial colleague of mine wisely said a while ago that each court’s procedural frame-
work, its Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the case law emanating on 
that basis, determine its modus operandi, and that any generic declarations of intent or 
principle, regardless of who makes them, cannot override the considered and balanced 
opinion of the judges of each court. I will be the first to admit that there is always room 
for improvement in the manner of how the judicial task is fulfilled, bearing in mind the 
reality that the perfect is the enemy of the good, but judges should never allow themselves 
to be pressured into becoming nothing more than managers of the law vying to be the 
“employee of the month.”
The international community, despite its manifold invocations of the Rule of Law and 
decades of establishing courts of all sorts, still seems to lack a real and deep understanding 
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of the fact that a judicial institution can never be a subsidiary organ of another: As soon as 
it is clothed in the mantle of judicial independence, it becomes a primary organ in its own 
right and sphere of operation, subject only to other judicial bodies to the extent that these 
are given appellate or supervisory functions in relation to it. Every judge has the choice— 
and the duty— to be a free agent:  No political party, no government, not even the UN 
Security Council have the right to interfere in their decision- making. Judges must not seek 
to curry favour with the external stakeholders by cutting corners for what are ultimately 
financial reasons. The only acceptable ethical choice which the creators of judicial entities 
are left with after they have given birth to them, is to nurture them to full growth until their 
mandate is completed. Neglect is not a moral option— it is death by a thousand cuts.
